It is often claimed that well-capitalized banks are less inclined to increase asset risk, because the option value of deposit insurance decreases with capitalization. However, bankers, regulators and some academics challenge this view. Since the traditional view relies on studies that neglect the managerial agency problem and do not consider “higher-risk, higher-return” assets, we revisit the issue assuming that three agents – deposit insurers, shareholders, and managers – all influence banks' risk levels. We examine four distinct assumptions on the characteristics of risk–return profiles and derive conditions under which banks' risk decreases or increases with capitalization.

We study a dynamic game in which all players initially possess the same information and coordinate on a high level of activity. Eventually, players with a long string of bad experiences become inactive. This prospect can cause a coordination avalanche in which all activity in the population stops. Coordination avalanches are part of Pareto-efficient equilibria; they can occur at any point in the game; their occurrence does not depend on the true state of nature; and allowing players to exchange information may merely hasten their onset. We present applications to search markets, organizational meltdown, and inefficient computer upgrades.