[Recent cases of hedge fund fraud have caused large losses for investors and have fueled the debate regarding the ability of regulators to oversee the industry. This article proposes a set of performance flags, based on suspicious patterns in returns, as indicators of a heightened risk of fraud. We collect a sample of hedge funds charged with legal or regulatory violations and find that funds charged with misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes trigger the performance flags at a higher frequency than other funds.]

[We show that familiarity affects the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers. Controlling for fund location, funds overweight stocks from their managers' home states by 12% compared with their peers. In team-managed funds, home-state overweighting is 37% larger than the fund location effect. The home-state bias is stronger if the manager is inexperienced, is resource-constrained, or spent more time in his home state. Home-state stocks do not outperform other holdings, confirming that home-state investments are not informed. The overweighting also leads to excessively risky portfolios.]

We find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: The number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and funds of all ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns, indicating a reversal in fund performance following small gains. This result suggests that the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily overstated returns.

We show that if true returns are independently distributed and a manager fully reports gains but delays reporting losses, then reported returns will feature conditional serial correlation. We use conditional serial correlation as a measure of conditional return smoothing. We estimate conditional serial correlation in a large sample of hedge funds. We find that the probability of observing conditional serial correlation is related to the volatility and magnitude of investor cash flows, consistent with conditional return smoothing in response to the risk of capital flight. We also present evidence that conditional serial correlation is a leading indicator of fraud.

Recent cases of hedge fund fraud have caused large losses for investors and have fueled the debate regarding the ability of regulators to oversee the industry. This article proposes a set of performance flags, based on suspicious patterns in returns, as indicators of a heightened risk of fraud. We collect a sample of hedge funds charged with legal or regulatory violations and find that funds charged with misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes trigger the performance flags at a higher frequency than other funds.

We find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: The number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and funds of all ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns, indicating a reversal in fund performance following small gains. This result suggests that the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily overstated returns.

We show that familiarity affects the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers. Controlling for fund location, funds overweight stocks from their managers' home states by 12% compared with their peers. In team-managed funds, home-state overweighting is 37% larger than the fund location effect. The home-state bias is stronger if the manager is inexperienced, is resource-constrained, or spent more time in his home state. Home-state stocks do not outperform other holdings, confirming that home-state investments are not informed. The overweighting also leads to excessively risky portfolios.

We find that socially connected fund managers have more similar holdings and trades. The overlap of funds whose managers reside in the same neighborhood is considerably higher than that of funds whose managers live in the same city but in different neighborhoods. These effects are larger when managers share a similar ethnic background, and are not explained by preferences. Valuable information is transmitted through these peer networks: a long‐short strategy composed of stocks purchased minus sold by neighboring managers delivers positive risk‐adjusted returns. Unlike prior empirical work, our tests disentangle the effects of social interactions from community effects.

This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as service providers in 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own affiliated funds. Using a hand‐collected data set on the menu of investment options offered to plan participants, we show that fund deletions and additions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated than unaffiliated funds. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, we find that the subsequent performance of poorly performing affiliated funds indicates that this favoritism is not information driven.

Using exogenous wealth shocks stemming from the collapse of the housing market, we show that managers who experience substantial losses in their home values subsequently reduce risk in their delegated funds. The decline in fund risk comes through reductions in idiosyncratic risk and tracking error, suggesting that the behavior is likely driven by career concerns. Our paper provides evidence that idiosyncratic personal preferences affect mutual fund managers’ professional decisions and offers a methodology for testing for manager effects that is not subject to the selection critique of Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013). Received March 30, 2016; editorial decision February 28, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Editor Itay Goldstein.