For articles eventually published in the top twenty academic finance journals and top-tier academic business journals, I examine the acceptance time (the time from first-round submission to final-round acceptance) and online/print publication times (the time from first-round submission to online/print publication). I find that the median acceptance times of the top five general-interest finance journals are: Journal of Financial Economics (9.9 months), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (10.6 months), Review of Finance (11.7 months), Review of Financial Studies (15.5 months), and Journal of Finance (19.8 months). The three fastest in finance are Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Review of Asset Pricing Studies, and Financial Management. Journal of Finance is one of the slowest top-tier business journals. Large and significant time differences support the editorial differences hypothesis. Received December 14, 2016; editorial decision December 22, 2016 by Editor Paolo Fulghieri.

Abstract We analyze the supply-side disruptions associated with COVID-19. We find that sectors in which a higher fraction of the workforce is not able to work remotely experienced greater declines in employment and expected revenue growth, worse stock market performance, and higher likelihood of default. The stock market overweights low-exposure industries. Thus, our findings cast light on the disconnect between stock market indices and aggregate outcomes. We combine these ex ante heterogeneous industry exposures with daily financial market data to create a stock return portfolio that tracks news about the supply-side disruptions resulting from the pandemic. (JEL G12, D22, H25, J20, E00)

In this paper, we review research into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting techniques and standards. We discuss how the predictions of extant economic consequence theories are driven by contracting and monitoring costs associated with management compensation contracts, bond covenants, regulation, and/or political visibility. We review empirical tests of economic consequence theories, categorize those tests, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. The empirical tests reveal two systematic associations with accounting choice: size, a proxy for political visibility, and leverage, a proxy for contracting and monitoring costs of lending agreements. Interpretation of the results is difficult, due to general limitations of the tests. We conclude by suggesting some directions for future research, based on our analysis of the potential payoffs associated with different types of empirical tests.

This paper contains evidence of a significant negative stock price reaction to media disclosures of ‘subject to’ qualified audit opinions. Disclosures of qualifications in the financial news media (the Wall Street Journal and the Broad Tape) are rare relative to the frequency of audit qualifications. Other studies do not detect an impact of qualified opinions on stock prices. None of the explanations for the difference in the results between this study and prior studies is consistent with the data. We are unable to draw strong inferences because we cannot identify the selection process that produces the sample of media disclosures.

We develop an integrated model in which a risk-neutral informed trader optimally chooses any combination of a market buy, a market sell, a limit buy including the limit buy price, and a limit sell including the limit sell price. Limit orders undercut the market maker and generate transactions inside the bid-ask spread. The informed trader exploits limit orders by submitting market orders even when the terminal value is inside the spread. When the terminal value is above the bid, a combined market buy-limit sell is more profitable than a market buy only. We obtain an analytic solution. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, D82, G12, G14.

Ball, Robin and Wu (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2003, this issue) investigate the relationship between accounting standards and the structure of other institutions on the attributes of the financial reporting system. They find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that beyond accounting standards, the structure of other institutions, such as incentives of preparers and auditors, enforcement mechanisms and ownership structure affects the outcome of the financial reporting system. However, interpretation of the evidence with respect to the notion of quality of the financial reporting system and the quality of accounting standards that the authors introduce is problematic.