In this paper, we study credit risk transfer (CRT) in an economy with endogenous financing (by both banks and non-bank institutions). Our analysis suggests that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. Moreover, we find the transfer of credit risk from banks to non-banks to be more beneficial than CRT within the banking sector. Intuitively, this is because it allows for the shedding of aggregate risk which must otherwise remain within the relatively more fragile banking sector. Therefore, regulators should act to maximize the benefits from CRT by encouraging the development of instruments favorable to the cross-sectoral transfer of aggregate credit risk (including basket credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations). Finally, we derive the optimal regulatory stance for banks relative to non-bank financial institutions. We show that a level playing field approach is sub-optimal. Regulatory stances should be set to actively encourage cross-sector CRT, first because of the higher fragility of the banking sector and second to induce banks to incur the costs of CRT which otherwise lead them to undertake an insufficient amount of CRT.

Abstract During the 1790s, European investors began to purchase substantial quantities of US government and corporate securities. A number of these securities were traded in markets on both sides of the Atlantic. Based on market price quotations we compiled for the same securities in London and New York markets, we ask if these early trans-Atlantic securities markets were integrated, and, if so, when they became integrated. We find little evidence of market integration before 1816, and substantial evidence of it thereafter. Financial globalization – the convergence of financial asset prices in markets on different continents – began earlier than most have suspected.

Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm's value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm's earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior to the forecast issuance decision. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm's historic ERC is positively associated with management's issuance of earnings forecasts.

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.

We investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. We document, after controlling for firm-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. We also provide evidence that CEOs of firms with speculative-grade credit ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree than their counterparts at firms with investment-grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why some firms operate with weak governance.

We investigate whether firms use stock repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. We identify conditions under which repurchases increase EPS and document the frequency of accretive repurchases from 1988 to 2001. We find a disproportionately large number of accretive stock repurchases among firms that would have missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase. The repurchase-induced component of earnings surprises appears to be discounted by the market, and this discount is larger when the repurchase seems motivated by EPS management, although using the repurchase to avoid missing analyst forecasts appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.

This paper examines the relation between insider ownership and corporate performance in the presence of adjustment costs and investigates how the adjustment costs are determined. In a model specification without adjustment costs, we find that insider ownership is significantly positively associated with corporate performance. But once we allow for adjustment costs, the relationship no longer exists. We find that insider ownership and corporate performance can be explained by their respective lagged values and that many firm characteristics that were previously useful in explaining these two variables turn out to be statistically insignificant. In addition, there is no evidence that insider ownership and corporate performance affect each other. This is consistent with the adjustment cost argument. It is also consistent with the “endogeneity” argument suggested by Demsetz [Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375–390.], Demsetz and Lehn [Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.], and Demsetz and Villalonga [Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. The ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209–233.]. Finally, we document that the speed of adjustment of insider ownership is positively related to insiders' market timing but negatively to the number of insiders and that the speed of adjustment of Tobin's Q is positively associated with financial leverage and stock price volatility.

It is often the case in default modeling that the need arises to calibrate a model to some prior probability of default. In many situations, a researcher may not know the true prior default rate for the population because the data set at hand is itself incomplete, either with respect to default identification (hidden defaults) or default under reporting. In situations where a researcher has access to two incomplete default data sets, for example in the case of two banks that have merged, it is possible to infer the number of “missing” defaults, which we demonstrate in this short note. We discuss an approach to estimating this quantity and show an example in which we infer the number of missing defaults in the combined legacy databases of the former Moody’s Risk Management Services and the former KMV Corporation. While calibration is one application of this approach, the method is a general one that can be applied in other settings as well.