Excessively easy bank credit – visible in unusually small credit risk spreads and rapid loan growth – is often posited as a root cause of unsustainable asset price booms. This paper considers whether an increase in bank risk tolerance drove high loan growth that coincided with Florida's land boom of the mid-1920s, the first Florida housing boom in which buyers from around the nation participated. Estimates suggest that an astounding 20 million lots were offered for sale in Florida at that time. Our detailed narrative and empirical evidence suggest that the facts do not require the assumption of increased risk appetite during the boom. We find that most Florida banks that failed were associated with the Manley-Anthony chain and did not exhibit increases in observable indicators of risk during the boom. Instead, their increases in risk mainly reflected hidden choices either to lend to bank insiders on a preferential basis or to fund other banks that were engaged in such risky and often fraudulent activities. Bank regulators seem to have been complicit in the hidden risk-taking. Even informed investors would have been left in the dark about the amount of risk that was growing in Florida.

We review the literature on financial intermediation in the process by which new medical therapeutics are financed, developed, and delivered. We discuss the contributing factors that lead to a key finding in the literature—underinvestment in biomedical R&D—and focus on the role that banks and other intermediaries can play in financing biomedical R&D and potentially closing this funding gap. We conclude with a discussion of the role of financial intermediation in the delivery of healthcare to patients.

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations in the during Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract with depositors to extend liability maturity structure, write off bad assets, and/or inject capital affected bank survival and deposit retention. This historical episode is particularly informative because there was no expectation of government intervention. We find that contracting with depositors provided short-term benefits while dealing with bad assets was key for long-run viability.

In 1936–37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks’ reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937–38. Using a new database on individual banks, we find that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks’ reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.

Abstract The vast majority of managers’ earnings forecasts are issued concurrently (i.e., bundled) with their firm’s current earnings announcement. We document a predictable bias in these forecasts—the forecasts fail to fully reflect the persistence of the current earnings surprise. Specifically, we find that managers issue (1) optimistically biased forecasts alongside negative earnings surprises and (2) pessimistically biased forecasts alongside large positive earnings surprises. Bayesian updating implies this bias could be unintentional, but we find that the bias is stronger when managers have greater incentives and fewer constraints to issue biased forecasts, suggesting that, to some extent, the bias might be intentional. Relatedly, although managers typically have better information about their firm’s earnings than analysts, we show that analyst reliance on these biased management forecasts represents a mechanism (and an alternative interpretation) for a similar analyst underreaction to current earnings attributed in the literature to analysts’ cognitive bias. We also find that, on average, investors do not appear to initially understand the bias in these forecasts but do unravel it over longer windows. However, investors more quickly unravel the bias when the manager has a history of issuing biased forecasts and when the firm has more sophisticated investors. Overall, we document that managers’ forecasts appear to repeatedly underweight the persistence of current earnings surprises, are biased in ways that improve investors’ perceptions of managers’ ability, and that this behavior concentrates in subsamples where outsiders have a harder time recognizing any bias.

We study how reputation incentives of influential independent directors (those holding multiple directorships) affect CEO compensation and firm financial reporting decisions. We find that CEO equity-based incentives, measured by CEO delta, vega and the number of equity grants are positively related to these directors' reputation incentives. These director reputation incentives also mitigate the perverse CEO incentives to inflate earnings, which arise from such high-powered compensation structures, by motivating increased board monitoring to limit discretionary accruals and real activity-based earnings management. These findings are invariant to endogeneity adjustments under multiple approaches, including exogenous changes in reputation incentives.

ABSTRACT Prior research on auditor industry specialization documents fee premiums for local audit offices that are industry specialists. This research assumes that the effects of specialization are uniform across markets. We examine industry specialization based on the economic theory of industry agglomeration (geographic areas with high industry concentration). Agglomeration economies can facilitate access to knowledge for auditors serving a specific industry in those locations. We find that industry specialists in agglomerations earn a fee premium in excess of specialists in other markets. We find that nonspecialist offices in agglomerations also earn fee premiums in that industry when compared to nonspecialists in other markets even when controlling for these groups’ absolute share of the national market. We also address whether or not this expertise can be shared among offices in an agglomeration specialist's firm. We find that audit offices that have easy connections to a within‐firm office in an agglomerated market can earn a fee premium relative to more distant offices, suggesting a benefit from knowledge transfer. This fee premium accrues to offices that would not be considered a specialist using traditional market share measures in a given industry. These findings indicate that the benefit of industry specialization depends on more than local market share.

I study investor responses to the 2020 bank stress tests that included restrictions on shareholder payouts. I find that banks subject to the stress tests and payout restrictions experienced both immediate and persistently lower excess stock price returns. In the cross-section, I find that excess stock returns declined with bank size but cannot otherwise be explained by pre-pandemic bank or payout characteristics, suggesting that investors penalized banks likely to experience greater regulatory scrutiny. However, the excess stock return penalties are smaller than those previously estimated in the literature examining voluntary payout reductions that signal bank distress. The results show that using supervisory discretion to take preventative actions in a crisis can be less costly than actions taken once banks are distressed.