We investigate how information flows within bank networks facilitate syndicate formation and lending in the leveraged buyout (LBO) market, where relationships between banks and borrowers are scarce and borrower opacity is high. Using novel measures that characterize a bank's ability to source and disseminate information within its loan syndication network, we show that the extent of this capability influences which banks join the syndicate, the share the lead bank holds, and LBO borrowing terms. Banks' ability to source and disseminate network-based information is particularly useful when ties to prospective borrowers are lacking, with the information flows extending beyond knowledge on PE firms and LBO targets.

We examine 68,044 completed or abandoned M&A transactions involving unlisted targets to determine the effect of transaction rumors on deal-closing propensity and transaction values. Estimation is challenging because rumors may be spread on purpose or emerge accidentally while transaction values are only observable for completed deals and no regulation requires to disclose them. We use indirect inference to overcome these challenges. We find that (a) M&A rumors are deal breakers, (b) rumored but closed deals have higher transaction values, and (c) the combined economic impact of (a) and (b) is negative: in expectation rumors destroy about 32% of transaction value.