An abundance of evidence relates facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) to masculine behaviors in males. We show that hedge funds operated by high-fWHR managers underperform those operated by low-fWHR managers, bear greater downside risk, are more susceptible to fire sales, and fail more often. High-fWHR managers compensate for their underperformance by marketing their funds more aggressively, thereby garnering higher flows and fee revenues. By exploiting major personal events that shape testosterone, namely marriage and fatherhood, we trace the biological mechanism underlying the relation between fWHR and investment performance to circulating testosterone. Our findings are robust and extend to equity mutual funds.

We study whether hedge funds make charitable donations to further their business interests. We find that donations are driven by poor fund flows and performance. Post-donation, donor funds experience lower outflows compared to matched non-donors. One-off donations and donations to charities which hold fundraising events catering to the hedge fund community are more likely to mitigate outflows after poor performance. These findings are consistent with strategic motivations driving at least some donations. While the economics of donations initially appear quite favorable to the hedge funds, the benefits from donations are not scalable. Moreover, investors punish donors through greater redemptions if poor performance persists post-donation.

We explore the impact of limited attention by analyzing the performance of hedge fund managers who are distracted by marital events. We find that marriages and divorces are associated with significantly lower fund alpha, during the six-month period surrounding and the two-year period after the event. Busy managers who manage multiple funds and who are not part of a team are more affected by marital transitions. Inattentive managers place fewer active bets relative to their style peers, load more on index stocks, exhibit higher R-squareds with respect to systematic factors, and are more prone to the disposition effect.

Hedge fund teams with heterogeneous educational backgrounds, academic specializations, work experiences, genders, and races, outperform homogeneous teams after adjusting for risk and fund characteristics. An event study of manager team transitions, instrumental variable regressions, and an analysis of managers who simultaneously operate solo- and team-managed funds address endogeneity concerns. Diverse teams deliver superior returns by arbitraging more stock anomalies, avoiding behavioral biases, and minimizing downside risks. Moreover, diversity allows hedge funds to circumvent capacity constraints and generate persistent performance. Our results suggest that diversity adds value in asset management. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

We show that hedge fund managers who more actively and astutely adjust the political sensitivity of their portfolios, in line with the dynamic U.S. political landscape, improve their investment performance. Funds that tilt their portfolios toward market segments expected to perform better during the new political regime, specifically around U.S. Presidential elections, generate significantly higher alphas. Further, hedge fund families with greater responsiveness to political changes exhibit persistently superior performance and are more likely to survive. Hedge fund investors reward more responsive fund managers with greater inflows.

ABSTRACT We show that, motivated by sensation seeking, hedge fund managers who own powerful sports cars take on more investment risk but do not deliver higher returns, resulting in lower Sharpe ratios, information ratios, and alphas. Moreover, sensation‐seeking managers trade more frequently, actively, and unconventionally, and prefer lottery‐like stocks. We show further that some investors are themselves susceptible to sensation seeking and that sensation‐seeking investors fuel the demand for sensation‐seeking managers. While investors perceive sensation seekers to be less competent, they do not fully appreciate the superior investment skills of sensation‐avoiding fund managers.