We use the year-end adjustments to the provisions for student loan losses of state and provincial governments in the United States and Canada to study government accounting conservatism and how it varies between these adjacent and highly integrated countries. Building on Canada’s more conservative cultural attributes, we hypothesize and find that Canadian provincial governments report more conservative provisions for student loan losses than U.S. state governments. Moreover, the year-end adjustments to the provisions in Canada are excessively conservative; they are larger than the audit materiality threshold. We further find that the political ideology of the government, government reporting incentives, government debt, and political competition are important determinants of government accounting conservatism. Finally, we find a negative association between the year-end adjustment to the provision and future student lending. This result suggests that government accounting conservatism leads to credit rationing and significant societal consequences for students. Overall, our study highlights important aspects of the determinants and consequences of government accounting conservatism. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine government unconditional accounting conservatism.

We examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in continental Europe affects the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and relative performance evaluation (RPE). The empirical evidence indicates a weak increase in accounting-based PPS in the post-adoption period, primarily driven by countries with large differences between IFRS and their previously adopted local accounting standards. We also document a significant increase in accounting-based RPE using foreign peers after the adoption. Additional analysis shows that the increase in RPE is greater for firms with more foreign sales, and for those with lower availability of domestic peers of comparable size. The overall results are consistent with the compensation committees in those countries perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher quality and comparability. Our paper highlights an important benefit of IFRS largely ignored by the literature, that is, the higher earnings quality and comparability brought by the adoption of IFRS facilitate executive compensation contracting.

ABSTRACT We combine a fundamental property of accruals and a behavioral phenomenon to provide an explanation for the accrual anomaly. The fundamental property is accruals that originate must subsequently reverse. The behavioral phenomenon is individuals tend to underestimate the variance of noisy signals in various domains of decision making. We argue that originating accruals represents a noisier signal than reversing accruals because the uncertainty of whether originating accruals will eventually convert into cash is high, while there is no uncertainty regarding reversing accruals. If investors underestimate the variance of originating accruals but understand reversing accruals, then originating accruals will be mispriced while reversing accruals will not. To test this prediction, we first develop and empirically validate a novel method for ex ante detecting accrual originations and their reversals. Then we document that investors face increased uncertainty when accruals originate and decreased uncertainty when accruals reverse, and we provide evidence that only originating accruals are mispriced. We further demonstrate that our findings can be useful for improving the accrual‐based trading strategy by ex ante detecting and removing accrual reversals from extreme accrual portfolios. Overall, we provide a behavioral explanation for the accrual anomaly that is consistent with the mispricing of originating accruals only.

This study examines the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts by female CEOs. We find that in the backdrop of increased pressure to perform from investors and other stakeholders, female CEOs tend to issue more earnings forecasts than male CEOs, and those forecasts are more accurate. We also find that while financial analysts generally prefer to follow companies headed by male CEOs, female CEOs’ efforts to issue accurate earnings forecasts pay off, as these efforts help them close the analyst coverage gap. We provide complementary evidence on the disclosure efforts of female CEOs with regard to updates to the forecast and the 10-K report. Lastly, we show that financial analysts rely more on the earnings forecasts of female CEOs, possibly because they recognize female CEOs’ superior forecasting quality. Our results are robust to the use of alternative research designs, including difference-in-difference, propensity score matching, and entropy balancing. Overall, our study documents gender differences in voluntary disclosure by senior management.

ABSTRACT Using the timeliness of misstatement discovery as a proxy for audit quality, we examine the association between audit firm tenure and audit quality in a setting that alleviates the endogeneity problem endemic to this line of research. We find that longer audit firm tenure leads to less timely discovery and correction of misstatements, which is consistent with a negative effect of long auditor tenure on audit quality. In addition, using the non-voluntary auditor change following the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002 as a natural experiment, we show that the misstatements of its former clients were discovered faster than those of comparable companies that retained their auditors throughout the misstatement. This finding speaks to the benefit of a fresh look by a new auditor. An extended analysis shows that longer auditor tenure also leads to misstatements of greater magnitudes, and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has mitigated, but not eliminated, the negative effect of long auditor tenure. Last, we show that the negative association between auditor tenure and timely discovery of misstatements is mainly present in the first ten years of an audit engagement. Our study has implications for regulators who continue to express concern regarding lengthy auditor-client engagement. JEL Classifications: K22; K23; L51; M41; M42; M48.