This paper explores differences, costs and benefits of the two systems public regulation of financial disclosure in the U.S. and private regulation in Great Britain and concludes that, in many important respects, private regulation is preferable. Though the U.S. and Great Britain are dissimilar in many important respects, their security markets are rather alike. Though the U.S. Federal Securities Acts were modeled after Great Britain's Companies Acts, they are administered quite differently. In 1934, the U.S. established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), giving it the authority to prepare and administer regulations governing the financial disclosure mandated by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In contrast, Great Britain's Companies Acts stand on their own in the sense that the specific disclosure required is given in acts rather than in regulations promulgated by the Great Britain's Department of Trade (DT). Although the DT has the power to investigate failures of directors to conform to the requirements of the acts, particularly when such an investigation is requested by security holders, it serves primarily as a repository for the statements filed pursuant to acts

James L. Bicksler, Session Topic: Studies in the Economics of Bank Regulation: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 31, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Dallas, Texas December 28-30, 1975 (May, 1976), pp. 252-255

Rate regulation of electric utilities in the United States is accomplished using a rate of return on capital limitation. The firm is allowed to charge rates which are designed to produce no more than some specified return on its capital. During the course of setting rates there are several intermediate steps. The commission must determine the proper or fair rate of return, the depreciated capital or rate base to which the allowed rate of return is to be applied, the firm's current revenues, revenues under proposed new rates, and allowable expenses

The reasons for the shift from private to public ownership of urban transit facilities are the subject of the paper. The regulation theory suggests that this shift is due to the increasing severity of regulation, while the declining-market and externalities hypotheses suggest that increases in automobile ownership are the reason for reduced profits and public ownership. Regression results indicate that profit margins of privately owned systems are higher when regulation is by a state rather than a local agency. Changes in profit margins over time are found to be directly related to increases in automobile ownership

The reasons for the shift from private to public ownership of urban transit facilities are the subject of the paper. The regulation theory suggests that this shift is due to the increasing severity of regulation, while the declining-market and externalities hypotheses suggest that increases in automobile ownership are the reason for reduced profits and public ownership. Regression results indicate that profit margins of privately owned systems are higher when regulation is by a state rather than a local agency. Changes in profit margins over time are found to be directly related to increases in automobile ownership

The opponents and proponents of competitive brokerage commission rates for the New York Stock Exchange have, for nearly a decade, been dueling in the hearing rooms of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The contest developed because financial institutions, in attempting to skirt the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and its fixed commission rates, had used a variety of trading practices that were sharply criticized by the government overseers of the securities markets. The securities industry, the government overseers, and scholars have debated what would be the most effective regulatory approach to improving the social performance of the securities marketplace. Would it be through initiating even more stringent federal regulation of exchange behavior? Or, would it be through selective deregulation to increase competition, particularly in the determination of commissions? Competitive forces might constrain and direct that behavior. The policy that has been developing would deregulate and restructure the marketplace to create a “central market system.” Competition would replace regulation to whatever extent may be possible, in determining both commission rates and the quality of marketplace services provided [6]. But, the contest has been long and often heated. From the thrusts and parries, there can be identified some fundamental issues concerning the economics of the stock exchange as a form of marketplace organization

1. This paper presents and tests a model of dealer inventory response. The estimated inventory responsiveness coefficient is statistically significant and its magnitude is consistent with reasonable values of underlying variables which, it is hypothesized, determine the coefficient.2. The sign of the inventory responsiveness coefficient indicates that dealers tend to be passive and acquire shares when prices fall and sell shares when prices rise. This type of behavior is sometimes termed “stabilizing.”3. Dealer inventories tend to increase on days prior to price declines and tend to decrease on days prior to price increases; that is, inventory changes tend to be “destabilizing” with respect to future price changes. This implies that a fraction of the public trades on superior information and that dealers tend to lose money to such information traders.4. There is a strong tendency for dealer inventory levels to return to normal, presumably zero. The implied typical inventory holding period is about 8 to 10 trading days.5. Comparison of NASDAQ dealers and NYSE specialists shows that the pattern of inventory responsiveness is very much the same for the two. This suggests that both act in accordance with the underlying economic model and that differential regulation has little effect on typical inventory responsiveness.6. This finding does not obviate the possibility that individual dealers or specialists behave in atypical or undersirable ways, and that the extent of such atypical behavior might depend on the degree of public regulation of dealer activities. An exhaustive comparative study of deviations from normal behavior was not possible. However, it was possible to compare the frequency of nonstabilizing transactions in which price change and inventory change on a given day are in the same, rather than opposite, direction. One could not conclude that NASDAQ dealers had more nonstabilizing activity than NYSE specialists