Reviews the book "Accounting and Federal Regulation," by James P. Bedingfield

Business combinations, Regulatory changes, Net benefits of estimated future acquisition activity, Regulation

The effectiveness of bank capital adequacy requirements is examined in this paper. Using empirical tests similar to those employed by Peltzman and Mingo, no significant relationship is found between changes in bank capital and the capital standards imposed by regulators. The findings conflict with those of previous studies. The conflict in findings, it is argued, results from the failure of previous studies to account for the effect of binding deposit rate ceilings

The effectiveness of bank capital adequacy requirements is examined in this paper. Using empirical tests similar to those employed by Peltzman and Mingo, no significant relationship is found between changes in bank capital and the capital standards imposed by regulators. The findings conflict with those of previous studies. The conflict in findings, it is argued, results from the failure of previous studies to account for the effect of binding deposit rate ceilings

Dennis E. Logue, Lemma W. Senbet, External Currency Market Equilibrium and its Implications for Regulation of the Eurocurrency Market, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings Forty-First Annual Meeting American Finance Association New York, N.Y. December 28-30, 1982 (May, 1983), pp. 435-447

Bernard Dumas, External Currency Market Equilibrium and its Implications for Regulation of the Eurocurrency Market: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings Forty-First Annual Meeting American Finance Association New York, N.Y. December 28-30, 1982 (May, 1983), pp. 468-470

Three separate effects of regulatory policies on enterprise decisions can be distinguished. First, increased regulatory penalties will diminish output and profits in static models or, equivalently, in multiperiod models in which investments are completely reversible, as is well known. Second, if investment commitments are irreversible, there will be an additional effect of a known schedule of changes in the regulatory policy, which will depress output even further. Finally, the addition of uncertainty with regard to regulatory policy produces a third effect resulting in expected opportunity losses for firms. Both output and quality investments will be depressed by regulatory policy lotteries. Regulations influence current enterprise decisions not only through their current level, but through their expected future level and the degree of uncertainty regarding these future regulatory policies. 9 references, 1 figure

The purpose of this paper is to analyze both theoretically and empirically the effect of selected government regulations on a high‐risk personal loan market. Unlike previous studies, which have generally relied on a loosely specified theory and then tested this theory with statewide aggregate data, our analysis is based on a more tightly specified model for individual loans which is then tested using statewide disaggregated data. The empirical results indicate that the regulatory effects are not only significant but consistent with our theoretical microeconomic model

A monopolist may earn greater profits by setting a nonuniform price schedule (one in which the price varies with the quantity purchased) than by charging a uniform price. In general, the profit maximizing non-uniform price schedule and the welfare maximizing schedule do not coincide. Thus, there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation. The paper considers a regulator who has limited information and authority. The issues addressed centre around the question of whether the level of total market output can be taken as a measure of market performance. Conditions under which welfare is a monotonic function of the level of total output are derived. 1

In this paper, we review research into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting techniques and standards. We discuss how the predictions of extant economic consequence theories are driven by contracting and monitoring costs associated with management compensation contracts, bond covenants, regulation, and/or political visibility. We review empirical tests of economic consequence theories, categorize those tests, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. The empirical tests reveal two systematic associations with accounting choice: size, a proxy for political visibility, and leverage, a proxy for contracting and monitoring costs of lending agreements. Interpretation of the results is difficult, due to general limitations of the tests. We conclude by suggesting some directions for future research, based on our analysis of the potential payoffs associated with different types of empirical tests