This paper addresses whether events leading to three regulatory accounting principles issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board affected the market value of Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls). The market reaction to these regulations is predicted to be positive since they effectively eased minimum regulatory net worth requirements. A significant market reaction is observed for the regulation that allowed S&Ls to increase regulatory net worth by permitting appraised equity capital. However, results are inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis associated with the regulations permitting deferral of loan losses and net worth certificates

Tim R. Sass, J. Paul Leigh, The Market for Safety Regulation and the Effect of Regulation on Fatalities: The Case of Motorcycle Helmet Laws, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 167-172

William J. Hausman, John L. Neufeld, Property Rights Versus Public Spirit: Ownership and Efficiency of U.S. Electric Utilities Prior to Rate-of-Return Regulation, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 414-423

Proponents claim that a statutory overtime premium, by raising the relative cost of overtime, may encourage firms to substitute employment for overtime hours. The author argues that there will be no real effects if firms reduce straight-time wages so as to offer the same package of weekly compensation and hours of work that was acceptable initially. Empirical analysis suggests that wage differentials do arise to mitigate the purely demand-driven effects predicted by previous models, but these differentials are not large enough to neutralize overtime pay regulation completely

Addresses the issue of self-selection bias in the analysis of economic consequences of mandatory accounting changes. Use of the case of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 2 to illustrate the effects of selection bias on studying the economic consequences of accounting regulation; Result of the switching regression analysis; Sources of selection bias

The paper develops an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics and shows the following: (1) the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation. (2) The threat of producer protection leads to low-powered incentive schemes for regulated firms. (3) Consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm. (4) An interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation, where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal (Congress

Auditing, Management Advisory Services, Contracting, Economies of scope

[Stock prices cluster on round fractions. Clustering increases with price level and volatility, and decreases with capitalization and transaction frequency. Clustering is pervasive. Price clustering will occur if traders use discrete price sets to simplify their negotiations. Exchange regulations require that most stocks be traded on eighths. Clustering on larger fractions will occur if traders choose to use discrete price sets based on quarters, halves, or whole numbers. An econometric model of clustering is derived and estimated. Projections from the results suggest that traders would frequently use odd sixteenths when trading low-price stocks, if exchange regulations permitted trading on sixteenths

Stock prices cluster on round fractions. Clustering increases with price level and volatility, and decreases with capitalization and transaction frequency. Clustering is pervasive. Price clustering will occur if traders use discrete price sets to simplify their negotiations. Exchange regulations require that most stocks be traded on eighths. Clustering on larger fractions will occur if traders choose to use discrete price sets based on quarters, halves, or whole numbers. An econometric model of clustering is derived and estimated. Projections from the results suggest that traders would frequently use odd sixteenths when trading low-price stocks, if exchange regulations permitted trading on sixteenths. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies