This study investigates if the use of derivatives by corporations is likely to affect their financing strategies. I find a strong positive relation between the minimum revenue guaranteed by hedging and investment expenditure. This result implies that hedging increases the likelihood that investments can be financed internally. I also find that firms tend to finance their investment expenditures externally rather than internally. If external capital is more costly than internal capital it would clearly be in a firm's interestto reduce its dependence on external capital. Consistent with this result, Ifind that the median firm that does not hedge finances 100% of its investment expenditures externally, while the median firm that hedges finances only 86% of investments externally. JEL classification codes: G32

This paper analyzes why gold mining firms use options instead of linear strategies to hedge their gold price risk. Consistent with financial constraints based theories, the largest and least financially constrained firms are the most likely to hedge with insurance strategies (put options), while more constrained firms finance the purchase of puts by selling calls (collars). The most financially constrained firms use strategies that involve selling calls. Firms with large investment programs are also more likely to use insurance rather than linear strategies. Firms’ hedging instrument choices are also correlated with current market conditions, suggesting that managers’ market views partially drive hedging instrument choices.

This paper shows how the credit risk premium affects firms' optimal hedging strategies. The model predicts that if the credit risk premium is relatively small, firms use convex hedging strategies. If the credit risk premium is relatively large, firms use concave hedging strategies. Firms in between those two extremes use strategies that feature both convex and concave elements, e.g. collar strategies. Finally, firms that are unlevered, invest little and are exposed to few non-hedgeable risks are the most likely to use linear approximations of the optimal strategy. The model replicates essentially all observed hedging strategies in the gold mining industry.

We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated deals, however, the presence of a relationship lead arranger reduces the use of PSD because a lead arranger has little incentive to hold-up a client. Further supporting the hypothesis that hold-up concerns motivate the use of PSD, we find a substitution effect between the use of PSD and the tightness of financial covenants.

We use the financial crisis of 2007–2009 as a laboratory to examine the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers in asset management. We find that when a fund uses complex trading strategies involving the use of CDS team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds. This may be due to the greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to single managers. During the financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams becomes negative, which may be because of the slower decision times of teams, which are especially costly during times of rapidly changing market conditions.

We examine whether managerial overconfidence can help explain the observed discrepancies between the theory and practice of corporate risk management. We use a unique dataset of corporate derivatives positions that enables us to directly observe managerial reactions to their (speculative) gains and losses from market timing when they use derivatives. We find that managers increase their speculative activities using derivatives following speculative cash flow gains, while they do not reduce their speculative activities following speculative losses. This asymmetric response is consistent with the selective self-attribution associated with overconfidence. Our time series approach to measuring overconfidence complements cross-sectional approaches currently used in the literature. Our results show that managerial overconfidence, which has been found to influence a number of corporate decisions, also affects corporate risk management decisions.

The widespread practice of managers speculating by incorporating their market views into firms’ hedging programs (“selective hedging”) remains a puzzle. Using a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms, we find no evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among firms that are believed to possess an information advantage. In contrast, we find strong evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among financially constrained firms, suggesting that this practice is driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.

We explore the role of natural characteristics in determining the worldwide spatial distribution of economic activity, as proxied by lights at night, observed across 240,000 grid cells. A parsimonious set of 24 physical geography attributes explains 47% of worldwide variation and 35% of within-country variation in lights. We divide geographic characteristics into two groups, those primarily important for agriculture and those primarily important for trade, and confront a puzzle. In examining within-country variation in lights, among countries that developed early, agricultural variables incrementally explain over 6 times as much variation in lights as do trade variables, while among late developing countries the ratio is only about 1.5, even though the latter group is far more dependent on agriculture. Correspondingly, the marginal effects of agricultural variables as a group on lights are larger in absolute value, and those for trade smaller, for early developers than for late developers. We show that this apparent puzzle is explained by persistence and the differential timing of technological shocks in the two sets of countries. For early developers, structural transformation due to rising agricultural productivity began when transport costs were still high, so cities were localized in agricultural regions. When transport costs fell, these agglomerations persisted. In late-developing countries, transport costs fell before structural transformation. To exploit urban scale economies, manufacturing agglomerated in relatively few, often coastal, locations. Consistent with this explanation, countries that developed earlier are more spatially equal in their distribution of education and economic activity than late developers.

ABSTRACT We analyze the hedging decisions of firms, within an equilibrium setting that allows us to examine how a firm's hedging choice depends on the hedging choices of its competitors. Within this equilibrium some firms hedge while others do not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The fraction of firms that hedge depends on industry characteristics, such as the number of firms in the industry, the elasticity of demand, and the convexity of production costs. Consistent with prior empirical findings, the model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the decision to hedge in the most competitive industries.