In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.

Corporate conference calls are large-scale telephone conference calls during which managers make presentations to and answer questions from various market participants, usually about earnings. In this paper, we sample 1,056 corporate conference calls made by 808 firms during February-November 1995 to provide evidence on three questions: (1) whether conference calls provide information to stock market participants, (2) whether investors have equal access to the information provided during these calls, and (3) why managers of some firms hold conference calls while managers of other firms do not. We believe this research is important because managers' use of conference calls has grown enormously, yet we know little about how these calls affect investors.1

Research documents price co‐movements, or “spillovers,” between focal firms and their peers at focal firms’ earnings announcements. We find that both signed and absolute co‐movements between focal‐ and peer‐firm returns are significantly lower at earnings‐announcement dates compared to other dates. Analytically, we demonstrate that co‐movements do not necessarily indicate common information; instead, co‐movements measure the relative proportion of focal firm‐specific information to common information in focal‐firm earnings announcements. We study three settings where information transfers might be higher: when focal firms report significant earnings surprises, are industry leaders, or share correlated earnings patterns with peer firms. We continue to find lower return correlations during focal‐firm earnings announcements. We conduct two alternative tests but fail to find evidence that common information released during focal‐firm earnings announcements is significantly greater than on other days. These results raise doubt about the extent of the information externality attributable to financial‐report releases.