This study investigates if market risk-based capital requirements (MRR) implemented in 1998 mitigated bank risk associated with trading activities. Recognizing that only banks with sufficiently high trading activities are subject to the MRR (regulated), we implement a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to show that in the post-MRR period, unregulated banks experienced an increase in risk associated with trading activity, while their regulated counterparts enjoyed no appreciable change in trading-related risk. We interpret the resulting negative DID coefficient as the evidence of a risk-mitigating effect of the MRR. This effect disappears at already well-capitalized banks. We also show that upon the implementation of the MRR, unregulated banks exhibit a significantly larger increase in contribution of opaque trading activity to bid-ask spreads, compared to regulated banks, for which the association between trading activity and bid-ask spreads actually declines. Our results are consistent with the view that the MRR significantly reduced moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with opaque trading activities.

In this study, we explore the hedge fund activist (HFA) influence on managerial decisions in the opaque banking industry. Focusing on loan loss provisions (LLPs), an accounting item that is subject to considerable managerial discretion as well as scrutiny from various regulatory agencies, we find that HFAs alleviate the agency problems associated with bank loan loss provisioning decisions. The findings show that HFA influence leads to a substantial reduction in overstatements, but not understatements, of LLPs at target banks. This results in a prompt increase in bottom-line profitability and stock returns, while pointing to no appreciable change in bank risk. We conclude that the disciplinary effect of HFAs contributes to shareholder value by leading to a reduction in excessive loan loss provisioning consistent with a realignment of LLP decisions with target bank shareholders’ interests.