While the benefits of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not. This paper argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profit once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.

The authors examine data on analyst following for a sample of initial public offerings completed between 1975 and 1987 to see how they related to three well-documented initial public offering (IPO) anomalies. They find that higher underpricing leads to increased analyst following. Analysts are overoptimistic about the earnings potential and long-term growth prospects of recent IPOs. More firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. In the long run, IPOs have better stock performance when analysts ascribe low growth potential rather than high growth potential. These results suggest that the anomalies may be partially driven by overoptimism.

Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending.

The authors investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. The authors find that factors identified by previous studies as correlated in the cross-section with firm leverage in the United States are similarly correlated in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still largely unresolved.

This paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm. The authors analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the Small Business Administration. The primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases. The authors find smaller effects on the price of credit. Attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple leaders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit. In sum, relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices.

To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to differentiate her enterprise from the ordinary. To take collaborators with her, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain control rights that will allow them to be repaid. A vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations. The nature of firms and financing are intimately linked.

While the benefits of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not. This paper argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.

We examine data on analyst following for a sample of initial public offerings completed between 1975 and 1987 to see how they relate to three well‐documented IPO anomalies. We find that higher underpricing leads to increased analyst following. Analysts are overoptimistic about the earnings potential and long term growth prospects of recent IPOs. More firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. In the long run, IPOs have better stock performance when analysts ascribe low growth potential rather than high growth potential. These results suggest that the anomalies may be partially driven by overoptimism.