Is financial innovation necessary for sustaining economic growth? To address this question, we build a Schumpeterian model in which entrepreneurs earn profits by inventing better goods and profit-maximizing financiers arise to screen entrepreneurs. The model has two novel features. First, financiers engage in the costly but potentially profitable process of innovation: they can invent better methods for screening entrepreneurs. Second, every screening process becomes less effective as technology advances. The model predicts that technological innovation and economic growth eventually stop unless financiers innovate. Empirical evidence is consistent with this dynamic, synergistic model of financial and technological innovation

Speculators who prey on hedgers can stifle financial innovation in the sense that new markets can fail. In this paper I analyze whether a profit maximizing exchange nonetheless chooses to open markets for speculative securities and if so, how to circumvent the problem of market failure. I find that the optimal financial innovation takes two forms. The first is a market structure consisting of hedge instruments, traded in low volume at stable asset prices. The second is a market structure consisting of speculative instruments, traded in greater volume at volatile asset prices. These strategies are derived within the same framework where the cost and the quality of the speculators' information set and the hedgers risk aversion ultimately determine which is the optimal one

Using the case of the pogroms that took place in the historical region of the 'Pale of Settlement' in Eastern Europe, this paper analyzes the cultural legacy of ethnic violence and its long-term economic impact on access to finance and on corporate innovation. We find that firms in regions with a higher historical intensity of ethnic persecution face greater financial constraints, relying more on internal finance and experiencing reduced access to external finance. These financial limitations are linked to sluggish innovation activities among present-day firms. We propose that a mechanism of financial antipathy, rooted in a persistent anti-market culture fostered by historical ethnic animosity, explains these effects and reflects a long-term degradation of local social capital. Our results are supported by causal evidence using instrumental variables based on the precursors of historical inter-ethnic violence. The animosity and discrimination against the minority group appear to transfer to the broader economic activities in which that group was involved, creating lasting economic consequences for the majority population – consequences that continue to affect financial development and innovation to the present day

This study investigates the role of asymmetric information for the pricing, issuance volume, and design of innovative securities. By analyzing the information that structured product issuers provide to the investors of those products, we can identify specific sources of asymmetric information between the issuers and investors in this market. We show that issuers exploit this information friction to offer products to investors that appear more profitable for the issuer. In addition, we find that the friction induces issuers to design products with higher information asymmetry. Our results suggest that product issuers’ behavior increases information frictions in the financial system

The high-tech sector accounts for the majority of corporate innovation in modern economies. In a sample of 38 countries, we document a strong positive relation between the initial size of the country's high-tech sector and subsequent rates of GDP and total factor productivity growth. We also find a strong positive connection between a country's equity (but not credit) market development and the size of its high-tech sector. Our main difference-in-differences estimates show that better developed stock markets support faster growth of innovative-intensive, high-tech industries. The main channels for this effect are higher rates of productivity and faster growth in the number of new high-tech firms. Credit market development fosters growth in industries that rely on external finance for physical capital accumulation but is unimportant for growth in innovation-intensive industries. These findings show that stock markets and credit markets play important but distinct roles in supporting economic growth. Stock markets are uniquely suited for financing technology-led growth, a particularly important concern for advanced economies

I examine how US commercial bank loan portfolios change in response to the rise of securitization markets and banking market deregulations over 1976–2003. Banks increasingly tilt their portfolios toward real-estate-backed loans. However, there are significant differences across banks. Larger banks and younger banks disproportionately shift their lending toward real-estate-backed loans, particularly commercial real-estate-backed loans, whereas smaller banks and older banks maintain greater shares of their loan portfolios in commercial and personal loans. When larger banks make more real-estate-backed loans, they charge lower interest rates, consistent with these banks lowering the costs of lending and expanding credit for borrowers. In contrast, smaller banks charge higher interest rates, consistent with these banks restricting lending to a select group of borrowers.

Recently, calendar spread futures, futures contracts whose underlying asset is the difference of two futures contracts with different delivery dates, have been successfully introduced for a number of financial futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. A spread futures contract is not an obvious financial innovation, as it is a derivative on a derivative security: a spread futures position can be replicated by taking positions in the two underlying futures contracts, both of which may already be quite liquid. This paper provides a motivation for this innovation, demonstrating how the introduction of spread futures can, by changing the relative trading patterns of hedgers and informed traders, affect equilibrium bid–ask spreads, improve hedger welfare, and potentially improve market-maker expected profits. These results are robust both to allowing serial correlation of asset price changes, and investor preference for skewness

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference