Knowledge that Transforms

Although IMF support is supposed to benefit a country, it might be bad news that the IMF believes intervention is necessary. This paper analyzes a bank run model in which both the liquidity effect and the signalling effect of the intervention occur. The IMF strategically provides liquidity support to facilitate market functioning. When the IMF intervenes and has large resources, it uses the signalling to aim for a “half run” and off-sets the negative consequences with the liquidity support. For small IMF resources, the negative signalling effect might not be off-set and the IMF presence can be distorting.

Large bank failures are often handled differently to other firm failures because suddenly closing a large bank and consequently freezing otherwise liquid claims raises financial stability concerns. As a result, substantial public funds are often used as part of the resolution process, which can undermine market discipline and longer-term financial stability. We propose a resolution scheme that enables the good portion of creditors’ claims to be quickly made available to them in way that maintains market discipline while managing the liquidity effects of large bank failures. We report on a New Zealand study into making the scheme work in practice.

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.

We estimate probabilities of bankruptcy for 5784 industrial firms in the period 1988–2002 in a model where common equity is viewed as a down-and-out barrier option on the firm's assets. Asset values and volatilities as well as firm-specific bankruptcy barriers are simultaneously backed out from the prices of traded equity. Implied barriers are significantly positive and monotonic in the firm's leverage and asset volatility. Our default probabilities display better calibration and discriminatory power than the ones inferred in a standard Black and Scholes [Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J. Pol. Econ. 81, 637–659]/Merton [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. J. Finance 29, 449–470] and KMV frameworks. However, accounting-based measures such as Altman Z- and Z″-scores outperform structural models in 1-year-ahead bankruptcy predictions, but lose relevance as the forecast horizon is extended.

Finland experienced an extremely severe economic depression in the early 1990s. As a part of the government's crisis management policies, significant new legislation was passed that increased supervisory powers of financial market regulators and reformed bankruptcy procedures significantly decreasing the protection of creditors. We show that the introduction of these new laws resulted in positive abnormal stock returns. The new laws also lead to increases in firms’ Tobin's q, especially for more levered firms. In contrast to previous studies, our results also suggest that public supervision of financial markets fosters rather than hampers financial market development.

Financial markets embed expectations of central bank policy into asset prices. This paper compares two approaches that extract a probability density of market beliefs. The first is a simulated moments estimator for option volatilities described in [Mizrach, B., 2002. When Did the Smart Money in Enron Lose Its’ Smirk? Rutgers University Working Paper #2002-24]; the second is a new approach developed by [Haas, M., Mittnik, S., Paolella, M.S., 2004a. Mixed normal conditional heteroskedasticity, J. Financial Econ. 2, 211–250] for fat-tailed conditionally heteroskedastic time series. In an application to the 1992–1993 European Exchange Rate Mechanism crises, we find that both the options and the underlying exchange rates provide useful information for policy makers.

This paper examines interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. There is a general view that central banks smooth interest rate changes to enhance the stability of financial markets. But might this induce a moral hazard problem, and induce financial institutions to maintain riskier portfolios, the presence of which would further inhibit active monetary policy? Hedging activities of financial institutions, such as the use of interest rate futures and swap markets to reduce risk, should further protect markets against consequences of unforeseen interest rate changes. Thus, smoothing may be both unnecessary and undesirable. The paper shows by a theoretical argument that smoothing interest rates may lead to indeterminacy of the economy's rational expectations equilibrium. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis supports the view that the Federal Reserve smoothes interest rates and reacts to interest rate futures. We add new evidence on the importance for policy of alternative indicators of financial markets stress.

We discuss the thorny issue of how to define financial stability, and conclude that the best approach is to define the characteristics of an episode of financial instability, and to define financial stability as a state of affairs in which episodes of instability are unlikely to occur. We then discuss public policies to achieve financial stability, distinguishing between preventive and remedial measures, and explore the costs and benefits of such policies. We conclude with some comments on current issues in financial regulation, including Basel 2.

This paper reviews the state-of-the-art of macro stress-testing methodologies. We assess the progress made both in the econometric analysis of balance sheet indicators and in the simulation of value-at-risk measures to assess system-wide vulnerabilities. To illustrate the main analytical approaches in the literature, we estimate two different models for stress-testing purposes using data for Finland over the time period from 1986 to 2003. The Finnish experience in the early 1990s appears particularly suited for macro stress-testing as it includes a severe recession with significantly higher-than-average default rates and banks’ loan losses. We highlight a number of methodological challenges that still remain concerning in particular the correlation of market and credit risks over time and across institutions, the limited time horizon generally used for macro stress-testing and the potential instability of reduced-form parameter estimates because of feedback effects.