Knowledge that Transforms

Using special CPS data on displaced workers, this article investigates the wage consequences of job displacement in a framework that emphasizes the effects of past job duration(s) and unemployment duration(s) on postdisplacement wages. Our model also attempts to take account of the simultaneity between unemployment duration and the postdisplacement wage. It is found that duration strongly reduces subsequent earnings and that considerable overstatement of the loss in firm-specific training investments is implied by conventional routes to measuring wage losses.

This article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance. Production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity; positive effects, where they exist, appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process. Lower profitability among unionized firms is well established; more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long-lived tangible and intangible capital. The connection between unions, investment behavior, and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry, although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism's long-run impact.

This article quantifies the role of plant construction, expansion, contraction, and closing in generating net and gross changes in U.S. manufacturing employment over the 1963-82 period. A new longitudinal data set, constructed from the plant-level observations collected in the last five Census of Manufactures, is utilized. The reallocation of employment opportunities across and within sectoral, regional, and cohort boundaries is measured. Over 70% of the turnover in employment opportunities occurs across plants within the same two-digit industry and geographic region. Systematic differences in the employment fluctuations of plants of different ages are also found.

Conventional analysis predicts that workers pay part of their on-the-job training costs by accepting a lower starting wage and subsequently realize a return to this investment in the form of greater wage growth. Missing from the conventional treatment of on-the-job training is a discussion of the process by which heterogeneous workers are matched to jobs requiring varying amounts of training. This matching process constitutes a key feature of the on-the-job training model presented in this article and tested with a unique data set containing extensive information concerning on-the-job training, employer search, wages, and wage and productivity growth.

This article investigates the experience of white-collar workers in nonprofit firms. The theoretical model of the nonprofit labor market suggests that workers supply labor to nonprofit organizations at lower than market wages in return for the opportunity to provide goods with positive social externalities. Average nonprofit wage differentials of approximately -0.20 and -0.05 are estimated for managers and professionals and for clerical and sales workers, respectively, in two national worker data sets. Further research is needed for more conclusive evidence concerning the possibility that the estimated differential may reflect low-quality workers selecting work in the nonprofit sector.

"Analyzing the location choices of the post-1964 U.S. immigrants results in three main findings: (1) these immigrants are more geographically concentrated than natives of the same age and ethnicity and reside in cities with large ethnic populations; (2) education plays a key role in location choice, reducing geographic concentration and the likelihood of being in cities with a high concentration of fellow countrymen and increasing the probability of changing locations after arrival in the United States; (3) internal migration within the United States occurs more frequently among immigrants than natives and facilitates the process of assimilation for the more educated individuals."

In an environment in which effort is private information to the worker, agreements between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent are likely to be risk-sharing and information-revealing mechanisms. It is shown that principal-agent contracts have significant implications for both compensation and employment rules in a simple work-sharing model. In general, such contracts involve incomplete income insurance and involuntary or excessive underemployment. This supports the view that models of worker-specific information, particularly with moral hazard, provide a natural explanation of underemployment.

This article presents an empirical study of strike activity in a panel of contract negotiations for some 250 firm-and-union pairs. Evidence is presented on two sources of variation in dispute rates: changes in the characteristics of the collective bargaining agreement that affect subsequent strike outcomes and the effects of lagged strikes on the incidence and duration of subsequent disputes. Strike probabilities are significantly affected by the duration and expiration month of the previous agreement. Dispute rates are also increased by the occurrence of a short strike during the previous negotiations and reduced by the occurrence of a long strike.

Unions are introduced into a general equilibrium model of firm formation. I find, under reasonable conditions, that large firms are more likely to be unionized, and that unionized firms are more productive and "better managed" than nonunion firms of the same size. As well, unions reduce economic efficiency by distorting the "occupation choice" decision between managing a firm and working in one. Perhaps surprisingly, this distortion persists even when individual union contracts set both wages and employment in a fully efficient manner but can disappear when the mechanism that allocates property rights to union jobs is changed in certain ways.

This article develops a framework for analyzing the impact of taxes and transfers on the length of time a person waits to accept a job while receiving transfer payments. It considers the impact of changes in the parameters of a generic tax-transfer system characterized by a guarantee and a tax rate on the costs and benefits of search. The analytical results indicate that increases in guarantees need not increase duration of unemployment-the results for unemployment insurance are a special case of the more general formulation developed in this article. In fact, increases in guarantees and increases in tax rates may shorten the duration of unemployment while decreasing the labor supply of transfer recipients.