Knowledge that Transforms

The choice between historical cost and fair value measurement is one of the most debated issues among accounting academics and practitioners. We use the election of the fair value option (FVO) to study the effects of entities’ measurement choices on accounting comparability. The FVO enables entities to use different measurement bases for similar assets and liabilities, raising questions about whether the FVO compromises or enhances comparability. Using a sample of US banks, we find that FVO elections increase comparability both across FVO electing banks and between FVO electing banks and banks that never elect the FVO but only if the FVO elections comply with the intent of the standard setters to remedy accounting mismatches. Overall our results suggest that banks elect the FVO to better present their economics, yielding higher comparability.

This paper investigates how tax loss carryforward (LCF) rules influence corporate bankruptcies and market-wide productivity. Analyzing data from 29 European countries, I find that stricter LCF deductibility limits significantly increase bankruptcy likelihoods. This is because stricter LCF deductibility limits lower the present value of net operating losses (NOLs) as tax assets, reducing the incentive to keep struggling firms alive. This effect is especially pronounced for business group firms, which can support struggling affiliates through internal capital markets to strategically exploit NOLs. My results suggest that lenient LCF deductibility limits can sustain unproductive firms, impacting market-wide resource allocation and productivity. These findings highlight the trade-off in tax policy between supporting firm survival and ensuring efficient resource allocation.

We investigate whether U.S. House representatives and their staff seek financial information from constituent firms to inform their legislative decisions. We exploit shifts in U.S. congressional districts (i.e., the reconfiguration of federal district lines or redistricting) that introduce new constituent firms to legislators’ districts. To the extent that legislators and their staff collect and rely on firms’ financial statement information, we expect that a change in representation as a result of redistricting will result in a significant and observable change in searches for information about new constituent firms. Our evidence supports this prediction. We also find that the timing of searching coincides with legislators’ roll call votes, particularly ahead of more controversial bills and for bills lobbied by sample firms. Finally, we find that new constituent firms respond to increased information demands after a redistricting event by supplying more policy-relevant disclosures and increasing lobbying.

We exploit differences in two industry classification schemes to distinguish between industry classification misfits and industry core firms. We posit that misfits differ from their industry peers, and we document consequences of this heterogeneity. Misfits have larger absolute abnormal accruals, firms in industries with a greater proportion of misfits have larger absolute abnormal accruals, and contemporaneous abnormal accruals are associated with future restatements for industry core firms but not for misfits. We attribute these results to measurement error generated by the inclusion of misfits in the estimation of accrual models. We then provide guidance to alleviate this issue. For both misfits and industry core firms, using fixed peer groups based on the largest firms in a given industry significantly outperforms other peer selection methods in detecting abnormal accruals. In additional analyses, we highlight other economic consequences of industry classification misfits such as higher information processing costs.

This study examines whether the revised lease standards (ASC 842 and IFRS 16) make U.S. GAAP-based accounting amounts more comparable with IFRS-based accounting amounts. Our study is motivated by the FASB and the IASB’s call for research on the comparability of the revised lease standards. We find that U.S. GAAP and IFRS pairs that are high operating lease users experience a larger increase in accounting comparability after the adoption of revised lease standards than low operating lease U.S. GAAP-IFRS pairs. Additionally, our results suggest that the improvement comes more from the changes to the balance sheet rather than the income statement and is more pronounced for IFRS firms from countries with stronger accounting enforcement. Lastly, we show that analysts who are more GAAP-focused (IFRS-focused) prior to the standard change are more likely to increase their forecasting of book value per share for IFRS (U.S. GAAP) firms.

This paper investigates how competition for scarce corporate resources impacts innovation incentives within multidivisional firms and, consequently, shapes firms’ preferences for fostering or restricting intra-firm competition. In our model, divisions become privately informed about the potential value of new investment opportunities generated through their innovation initiatives. We demonstrate that intra-firm competition unambiguously reduces divisions’ ex ante innovation incentives. However, it benefits ex post resource allocation by enabling the firm to (i) select the most promising project and (ii) limit the rents divisions earn from their private information. Consequently, a firm’s preference to limit or encourage interdivisional competition hinges on balancing ex post allocative efficiency, which favors increased intra-firm competition, against ex ante innovation incentives, which favor reduced competition. Our analysis identifies plausible conditions under which each organizational design—competitive or exclusive innovation—emerges as the optimal choice.

Pre-IPO firms may “test the waters” by meeting privately with investors in order to allow access to management and more time to make an investment decision. However, these meetings have the potential to undermine the SEC’s objectives of protecting investors and supporting market efficiency by allowing institutional investors, but not retail investors, private access to management. We find lower retail trading after IPOs of firms that held testing-the-waters meetings, consistent with the meetings reducing retail investor participation. Moreover, retail investors that still participate in the market in the presence of testing-the-waters meetings have inferior investment outcomes. Nonetheless, we find no evidence of lower overall market liquidity or slower price discovery following testing-the-waters meetings. In fact, we observe a reduction in stock return volatility. Overall our evidence suggests that, while testing-the-waters meetings may harm retail investors, there does not appear to be a negative impact on overall market function.