Knowledge that Transforms

We study the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the term structure of nominal interest rates. In a general equilibrium model populated by an uncertainty averse agent, we show that political uncertainty not only affects the yield curve and the corresponding volatility term structure but also bond risk premia carry a premium for political uncertainty. Our model simultaneously captures both the shape of the yield curve and the hump shape of yield volatilities, a stylized feature that is hard to match with a theoretical model. Our model gives rise to a set of testable predictions for which we find strong support in the data: Higher policy uncertainty leads to a significant decline in yield levels and increases bond yield volatilities. Moreover, policy uncertainty predicts future short rates and has an ambiguous effect on term premia. Finally, short (long) maturity bond risk premia respond negatively (positively) to increases in policy uncertainty.

Different share classes on the same firms provide a natural experiment to explore how investor clienteles affect momentum and short-term reversals. Domestic retail investors have a greater presence in Chinese A shares and foreign institutions are relatively more prevalent in B shares. These differences result from currency conversion restrictions and mandated investment quotas. We find that only B shares exhibit momentum and earnings drift and only A shares exhibit monthly reversals. Institutional ownership strengthens momentum in B shares. These patterns accord with a setting where short-term reversals (which represent inventory risk premia) prevail in a market dominated by noise traders and momentum prevails in markets where noise traders are less prevalent relative to informed investors who underreact to fundamental signals. Overall, our findings confirm that clienteles matter in generating stock return predictability from past returns.

Mandated post-trade transparency in secondary markets lowers the cost of issuing corporate bonds. We show that costs are lower due to the mitigation of information asymmetry in the issuing process. Three pieces of evidence support this finding. First, new issues with higher information asymmetry experience relatively larger reductions in issuing costs. These bonds also experience lower reductions in trading activity than lower information asymmetry bonds, so liquidity cannot explain these results. Second, when a larger fraction of trades in comparable bonds are made post-trade transparent, new issue pricing improves. This holds when conditioning on expected bond liquidity. Third, transparency raises prices in the secondary market, but not by as much as it does for newly issued bonds.

Using a new case-level dataset, we document a set of stylized facts on bankruptcy in China and study how the staggered introduction of specialized courts across Chinese cities affected insolvency resolution and the local economy. For identification, we compare bankruptcy cases handled by specialized versus traditional civil courts within the same city and filed in the same year. We find that specialized courts decrease case duration by 36% relative to traditional civil courts. We provide evidence consistent with court specialization increasing efficiency via selection of better trained judges and higher judicial independence from local politicians. We document that cities introducing specialized courts experience a relative reallocation of employment out of zombie firms-intensive sectors, as well as faster firm entry and a larger increase in average capital productivity.

In the investment theory, firms with high expected investment growth earn higher expected returns than firms with low expected investment growth, holding investment and expected profitability constant. Building on cross-sectional growth forecasts with Tobin’s q, operating cash flows, and change in return on equity as predictors, an expected growth factor earns an average premium of 0.84% per month (t = 10.27) in the 1967–2018 sample. The q5 model, which augments the Hou–Xue–Zhang (2015, Rev. Finan. Stud., 28, 650–705) q-factor model with the expected growth factor, shows strong explanatory power in the cross-section and outperforms the Fama–French (2018, J. Finan. Econom., 128, 234–252) six-factor model.

This article examines the effect of regulatory constraints on fund performance and risk by comparing conventional and UCITS hedge funds. Using a matching estimator approach, we estimate the indirect cost of UCITS regulation to be between 1.06% and 4.05% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. These performance differences are likely to stem from UCITS constraints such as those governing eligible assets, diversification, and short selling, and cannot be explained by differences in redemption terms or level of leverage. We confirm that our performance results are not driven by management company characteristics, fund manager characteristics, or unobserved confounder bias.

We study local loan conditions when banks close branches. In places where branch closures do not take place, firms that purposely switch banks receive a sixty-three basis points (bps) discount. However, after the closure of nearby branches of their credit-granting banks, firms that locally and hurriedly transfer to other banks receive no such discount. Yet, the loan default rate for the latter (more expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the former (cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that transfer firms are of “better” quality than switching firms. In sum, even if local markets remain competitive, when banks close branches, firms lose.

We show that returns to value strategies in individual equities, industries, commodities, currencies, global government bonds, and global stock indexes are predictable in the time series by their respective value spreads. In all these asset classes, expected value returns vary by at least as much as their unconditional level. A single common component of the value spreads captures about two-thirds of value return predictability and the remainder is asset class specific. We argue that common variation in value premia is consistent with rationally time-varying expected returns, because (i) common value is closely associated with standard proxies for risk premia, such as the dividend yield, intermediary leverage, and illiquidity, and (ii) value premia are globally high in bad times.

Firms in the US economy are closely interconnected in a production network and are subject to shocks that propagate within the network. This study examines the liquidity management of firms centrally connected in the network. I show that, while central firms are more exposed to aggregate swings, they maintain higher cash holdings to protect themselves and connected firms against such exposure. Central firms’ cash holding motives are alleviated by firm diversification but are aggravated by industry competition. Such motives are not explained by alternative determinants of cash policies. My findings suggest that systematically important firms proactively dampen the propagation of shocks in the production network.

This paper investigates the effect of access to finance on job growth in over 780,000 firms across twenty-two developing countries. Using the introduction of credit bureaus as an exogenous shock to the supply of credit, the paper finds that increased access to finance results in higher employment growth, especially among micro, small, and medium enterprises. The results are robust to using firm-fixed effects, industry measures of external finance dependence, and propensity score matching. Our findings have implications for policy interventions targeted to produce job growth.