Knowledge that Transforms

We examine a set of equity index-linked bonds that provide the same payoff as an investment in an equity index, but are relatively illiquid. We demonstrate that these securities sell at a discount relative to their underlying value and hence have higher expected returns. We show that this apparent mispricing can be attributed to the illiquidity of the bonds. Trading costs for equity-linked bonds, as measured by bid-ask spreads, are free of any asymmetric information or inventory holding cost component; hence the only illiquidity component left is clearing costs. This study shows that, even in the absence of asymmetric information and inventory holding costs, illiquidity depresses asset prices and therefore increases expected security returns. Using an ex ante measure of the expected return premium due to illiquidity, we link the time-series variation in the illiquidity premium to security-specific attributes related to their marketability. We show that liquidity risk has a systematic component, and relate this market-wide factor to a number of macroeconomic variables that have previously been shown to be related to illiquidity.

We study opening prices set simultaneously for German and French stocks in Frankfurt and Paris. In our model investors and traders based in the same country as the firm have better information on its value than foreign traders. Our theory implies that prices set on the domestic market differ from (and are more informationally efficient than) prices set on the foreign market. Empirically, we find significant price discrepancies between home and foreign prices, consistent with lack of integration of international financial markets. For German stocks, home prices are found to be informationally more efficient than foreign prices. The informational efficiency of French stock prices is comparable in the two markets when Frankfurt traders can observe Paris preopening prices before the opening.

We analyze the empirical predictions of ambiguity aversion in intertemporal heterogenous agents economies. We examine equilibria for two tract able wealth–homothetic settings of ambiguity aversion in continuous time. Each setting is motivated by a different robust control optimization problem. We show that ambiguity aversion affects optimal portfolios in a way that is similar to an increase in risk aversion. A distinct property of our second setting of ambiguity aversion is that this increase is state dependent, highly pronounced at moderate portfolio exposures and reduces equity-market participation. In general equilibrium, ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium and lowers interest rates. A distinct feature of our second setting of ambiguity aversion is that the equity premium part due to ambiguity aversion dominates when volatility is low.

Empirical evidence shows that the implied volatility smiles for index options are significantly steeper than those for individual options. We propose a model setup where we start from the joint dynamics of the stocks and where the index value is a weighted sum of individual stock prices. Then the differences between the index smile and the smiles for individual stocks are entirely determined by the dependence structure among the stocks. We illustrate our idea in a jump-diffusion framework where both the diffusion and the jumps are decomposed into common and idiosyncratic components. Empirical data for options on the German stock index DAX and on Deutsche Bank are used to show that the model can explain the stylized facts on implied volatility smiles.

We report on two sets of large-scale financial markets experiments that were designed to test the central proposition of modern asset pricing theory, namely, that risk premia are solely determined by covariance with aggregate risk. We analyze the pricing within the framework suggested by two theoretical models, namely, the (general) Arrow and Debreu's complete-markets model, and the (more specific) Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Completeness of the asset payoff structure justifies the former; the small (albeit non-negligible) risks justifies the latter. We observe swift convergence towards price patterns predicted in the Arrow and Debreu and CAPM models. This observation is significant, because subjects always lack the information to deliberately set asset prices using either model. In the first set of experiments, however, equilibration is not always robust, with markets temporarily veering away. We conjecture that this reflects our failure to control subject' beliefs about the temporal independence of the payouts. Confirming this conjecture, the anomaly disappears in a second set of experiments, where states were drawn without replacement. We formally test whether CAPM and Arrow–Debreu equilibrium can be used to predict price movements in our experiments and confirm the hypothesis. When multiplying the subject payout tenfold (in real terms), to US $ 500 on average for a 3-h experiment, the results are unaltered, except for an increase in the recorded risk premia.

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.

This paper presents empirical evidence that accounting for heterogeneity in financial market participation is important for evaluating the empirical performance of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). Using the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey as a common testing ground, I re-assess three well-known characterizations of the “equity premium puzzle”: (i) the inconsistency of the representative agent's IMRS with Hansen and Jagannathan bounds; (ii) Mehra and Prescott's calibration of a large representative agent's risk aversion; (iii) Hansen and the Singleton's large structural estimates of the preference parameters based on aggregate data. In all three cases, the estimates of risk aversion conditional upon financial market participation are not as far from reasonable values as the corresponding unconditional ones. The differences suggest that part of the “equity premium puzzle” can be accounted for by the use of a “representative agent” assumption rather than a more appropriate “representative stockholding agent” assumption.

This paper focuses on the joint dynamics of yield spreads derived from government bonds issued by member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). A descriptive analysis shows that there are substantial and volatile spreads between zero coupon yields of EMU member countries and German Bund yields. These yield spreads form an important source of additional risk that has to be taken into account by any pricing or risk management model dealing with EMU government bonds. We extract risk factors driving observed yield spreads by employing a multi-issuer version of the model originally proposed by Duffie and Singleton (1999). We adopt a state-space approach to implement the model whereby we can extract factor series and model parameters simultaneously. Our findings indicate that a parsimonious two-factor version of the multi-issuer model sufficiently captures the main features of the data. In this model the first factor turns out to be related to long term yield spreads across different issuers, whereas the second factor is related to short term yield spreads. Our evidence suggests that EMU government bond spreads are related to corporate bond spreads and swap spreads whereas we do not find evidence for a significant impact of macroeconomic or liquidity related variables.

Traders with short horizons and privately known loss limits interact in a market for a risky asset. Risk-averse, long horizon traders generate a downward sloping residual demand curve that faces the short-horizon traders. When the price falls close to the loss limits of the short horizon traders, selling of the risky asset by any trader increases the incentives for others to sell. Sales become mutually reinforcing among the short term traders, and payoffs analogous to a bank run are generated. A “liquidity black hole” is the analogue of the run outcome in a bank run model. Short horizon traders sell because others sell. Using global game techniques, we solve for the unique trigger point at which the liquidity black hole comes into existence. Empirical implications include the sharp V-shaped pattern in prices around the time of the liquidity black hole.

This paper investigates the forecasting accuracy of bankruptcy hazard rate models for U.S. companies over the time period 1962–1999 using both yearly and monthly observation intervals. The contribution of this paper is multiple-fold. One, using an expanded bankruptcy database we validate the superior forecasting performance of Shumway's (2001) model as opposed to Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984). Two, we demonstrate the importance of including industry effects in hazard rate estimation. Industry groupings are shown to significantly affect both the intercept and slope coefficients in the forecasting equations. Three, we extend the hazard rate model to apply to financial firms and monthly observation intervals. Due to data limitations, most of the existing literature employs only yearly observations. We show that bankruptcy prediction is markedly improved using monthly observation intervals. Fourth, consistent with the notion of market efficiency with respect to publicly available information, we demonstrate that accounting variables add little predictive power when market variables are already included in the bankruptcy model.