As discussed in Merton (1993, Sections 5 and 6) and here in the section to follow, the effective delivery of many financial services depends critically on the credit-worthiness of the provider financial institution. Such service activities are said to be 'credit-sensitive'. The intermediary's credit standing can cause significant extemality-like effects on the various business activities of the intermediary, even when there are no interconnections among them. For example, the announcement by a U.S. investment bank that it is even thinking of entering into a new merchant-banking activity of extending bridge financing and other interim risk-taking positioning for restructuring firms can materially and negatively affect its over-the-counter derivatives-products business for corporate customers because those customers may perceive the risk of the merchant-banking involvement as jeopardizing the bank's ability to fulfill its obligations on its long-dated contractual agreements. Thus the potential merchant-banking business affects the derivative-products business although there is no overlap of personnel, customer base, location, or employee skill sets between them. The shared credit standing of the institution's individual businesses can therefore cause a significant failure ofthe principle of 'value-additivity', which complicates decentralization of the capital budgeting and financial decisions. The issue of monitoring credit quality are made more complex because those intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies that are principals to customer contractual agreements tend to be 'opaque' institutions, as defined in Ross (1989) and Merton

Abstract We analyze the impact of a requirement similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio on the bank intermediation applying Regression Discontinuity Designs. Using a unique dataset on Dutch banks, we show that a liquidity requirement causes long-term borrowing and lending rates as well as demand for long-term interbank loans to increase. Lower levels of aggregate liquidity increase the estimated effects. Short-term borrowing and lending rates only rise during periods of lower market-wide liquidity. Further, banks do not seem able to pass on the increased funding costs in the interbank market to their private sector clients. Rather, a liquidity requirement seems to decrease banks’ interest margins.

Abstract This paper develops a novel method for classifying oil price changes as supply or demand driven using information in asset prices. Motivated by a simple model, demand shocks are identified as returns to an index of oil producing firms which are orthogonal to unexpected changes in the VIX index, with supply shocks capturing the remaining variation in oil prices. Demand shocks are strongly positively correlated with market returns and economic output, whereas supply shocks have a strong negative correlation. The negative correlation of supply shocks and returns is strongest in industries that produce consumer goods, while the positive correlation of demand shocks is stronger for industries which use relatively large amounts of oil as an input.

Abstract A theoretical model of the borrower–lender relationship predicts that increased competitive threats lead to a reduction in loan covenant restrictiveness that is stronger for groups of borrowers who face constraints to their ability to raise external financing or compete in the product market. These predictions arise because competition impacts the dynamics of borrower performance so that lenders must trade off the benefit of controlling agency problems against a heightened cost of lost product market opportunities for the borrower, ultimately lowering the optimal use of covenants. We find strong empirical support for these predictions, highlighting an important role of competition for optimal financial contracting rooted in underlying agency problems.

Abstract We consider mean-variance portfolio choice of a robust investor. The investor receives advice from J experts, each with a different prior for expected returns and risk, and follows a min-max portfolio strategy. The robust investor endogenously combines the experts' estimates. When experts agree on the main return generating factors, the investor relies on the advice of the expert with the strongest prior. Dispersed advice leads to averaging of the alternative estimates. The robust investor is likely to outperform alternative strategies. The theoretical analysis is supported by numerical simulations for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and for 81 European country and value portfolios.

Abstract Non-fundamental demand shocks have significant effects on asset prices, but observing these shocks is challenging. We use the exchange-traded fund (ETF) primary market to study non-fundamental demand. Unique to the ETF market, specialized arbitrageurs called authorized participants correct violations of the law of one price between an ETF and its underlying assets by creating or redeeming ETF shares. We show theoretically and empirically that creation and redemption activities (ETF flows) provide signals of non-fundamental demand shocks. A portfolio that is short high-flow ETFs and long low-flow ETFs earns excess returns of 1.1–2.0% per month, consistent with non-fundamental demand distorting asset prices away from fundamental values. Moreover, we show non-fundamental demand imposes non-trivial costs on investors, leading to underperformance.

Abstract In this article, we show that when banks increase their use of wholesale funding they shorten the maturity of loans to corporations. This effect appears to be linked to banks’ exposure to rollover risk resulting from their increasing use of short-term uninsured funding. Banks that use more wholesale funding shorten both the maturity of newly issued loans and the maturity of their loan portfolios. These results are not present among banks that rely predominantly on insured deposits. The link between wholesale funding and loan maturity is robust, and holds when we include firm-year fixed effects, suggesting that the decline in loan maturity is bank driven. In line with this premise, we find that the slope of the loan yield curve becomes steeper for banks that use more wholesale funding and that borrowers turn to the bond market to raise funding with longer maturity in response to banks’ loan maturity shortening.

This paper focuses on pricing and hedging options on a zero-coupon bond in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) framework when the value and/or functional form of forward interest rates volatility is unknown, but is assumed to lie between two fixed values. Due to the link existing between the drift and the diffusion coefficients of the forward rates in the Heath, Jarrow and Morton framework, this is equivalent to hedging and pricing the option when the underlying interest rate model is unknown. We show that a continuous range of option prices consistent with no arbitrage exist. This range is bounded by the smallest upper-hedging strategy and the largest lower-hedging strategy prices, which are characterized as the solutions of two non-linear partial differential equations. We also discuss several pricing and hedging illustrations.

Abstract This paper provides evidence that “illusory correlations”—a well-documented source of cognitive bias—lead some agents to be imperfectly rational noise traders. We focus on the head-and-shoulders chart pattern, considered by technical analysts to provide one of the most reliable trading signals. Our findings indicate that the pattern is associated with a substantial rise in trading volume even though it does not profitably predict directional movements. We further substantiate the connection between head-and-shoulders trading and imperfectly rational noise trading by showing that the pattern is associated with lower bid-ask spreads.

Abstract An important determinant of option prices is the elasticity of the pricing kernel used to price all claims in the economy. In this paper, we first show that for a given forward price of the underlying asset, option prices are higher when the elasticity of the pricing kernel is declining than when it is constant. We then investigate the implications of the elasticity of the pricing kernel for the stochastic process followed by the underlying asset. Given that the underlying information process follows a geometric Brownian motion, we demonstrate that constant elasticity of the pricing kernel is equivalent to a Brownian motion for the forward price of the underlying asset, so that the Black–Scholes formula correctly prices options on the asset. In contrast, declining elasticity implies that the forward price process is no longer a Brownian motion: it has higher volatility and exhibits autocorrelation. In this case, the Black–Scholes formula underprices all options.