Knowledge that Transforms

This article presents the findings of clinically based research which investigated the relationship between strategy and formal structure at the product level in five diversified consumer packaged goods firms. The findings establish that this relationship is severely constrained. The article also suggests how firms ‘accommodate’ when unable to match organizational structure with product strategy.

In Armstrong (1982a), I examined alternative explanations to the empirical findings that supported the use of formal planning. In considering the possibility that researcher bias might lead to such results, I used Terpstra's (1981) evaluation scheme. Based on this test, poor methodology did not seem responsible for the conclusions on the value of formal planning.

Japanese consultants have used Lanchester's military models to define monopoly, premium, duopoly, oligopoly and polyopoly market structures in which competitive conditions differ. These situations are investigated using the PIMS database. The findings refute the idea that monopoly and premium structures are more stable than the others. Instead movements between structures seem to follow a Markov process.

In an earlier paper in the SMJ , Armstrong (1982) conducted a review of the empirical evidence relating to the question of whether formal planning for strategic decision‐making pays off, or more concisely whether strategic planning pays. Armstrong found that the evidence was equivocal. He also found that the methodological purity of a number of the 12 studies, which he claimed to constitute the totality of the evidence, was in doubt. For that reason he assessed the rigour of the studies relative to a framework previously proposed by Terpstra (1981). Using this framework he found that the studies rated poorly.

This paper outlines a model of organizational strategy that takes into account both the task ambiguity and concentration of the environment. A competitive strategy, in the sense as used in classical economics, is most suitable with low task ambiguity and concentration. When task ambiguity increases a shift to an innovative strategy can be expected. When concentration is high consolidative and cooperative strategies with respectively low and high ambiguity can be expected. These latter two strategies, in particular, tend to impose institutional and regulatory constraints upon firms, an aspect that is seriously neglected in the conventional business policy and strategic management literature. This model is illustrated using the case of the British telecommunications industry which has recently been subject to considerable regulatory and technical change. Implications for management are that strategy should be matched to environmental conditions as defined by task ambiguity and concentration. However, these dimensions are not fixed but enacted by firms in a particular industry. Implications for government are that a more contingent approach to regulation and de‐regulation needs to be considered.