Knowledge that Transforms

Organizational structure information is deeply embedded in the different functional activities of accounting. This paper presents ORSO (ORganizational Structure Ontology), an ontology for describing organizational structures that can be reasoned with as part of accounting applications, developed following the principles and guidelines of design science research. ORSO allows the representation of key organizational constructs to meet internal and external accounting needs, including financial reporting requirements, analysis of an organization’s governance structure, economic analysis of agent and group performance, the definition and monitoring of controls, and responding to political and social inquiries about agents and other needs. A prototype is presented that demonstrates three possible types of applications of ORSO systems: (1) analysis of organizational structures, (2) accounting analysis through the integrated use of Resource-Event-Agent (REA) transaction data and ORSO specifications, and (3) constraint definition and monitoring. Data Availability: Additional information is available from the authors.

We examine the consequences of corporate tax enforcement for business activity. Using two different empirical approaches—a regional design and a firm-level design—we document that corporate tax enforcement is negatively associated with business activity, as measured by establishments and employment. This association is economically significant and is robust to tests that mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity and measurement. Furthermore, we find that the negative association between tax enforcement and business activity varies substantially in the cross-section. Specifically, we find that it is weaker for regions and firms with greater access to external financing sources and is stronger for regions and firms where compliance costs are likely higher and for which the ex ante costs of tax enforcement are greater. Our findings suggest that the effects of tax enforcement on business activity are economically important and heterogeneous, which should be of interest to academics and policymakers.

The audit environment operates using an apprenticeship model, where more experienced auditors are responsible for the training and development of junior auditors. Academic research has investigated this model primarily as a quality control mechanism for the subordinate’s work product. In contrast, we investigate what effect the apprenticeship model has on supervising auditors. We theorize that coaching an apprentice activates norms that are accompanied by an ideal audit quality focus. In an experiment with experienced auditors, we find that salient apprenticeship norms result in a higher-quality sample selection. Although work-life conflict has an overall negative effect on quality, we find no evidence that apprenticeship norms attenuate this effect. Finally, auditors faced with client pressure improve the quality of their subsequent inventory testing selections only when apprenticeship norms are salient. Our findings expand our understanding of the ways the traditional audit environment encourages quality behavior, with important implications for research and practice.

I examine whether and to what extent firms credibly disclose proprietary private information ahead of seasoned equity offerings. I assess proprietary information disclosures based on the magnitude of the association between a private information-based proxy and stock returns. Using a difference-in-differences design around the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) of 2005, which relaxed restrictions on disclosures, I find that equity-issuing firms disclose more than twice as much proprietary information post-SOR relative to pre-SOR and relative to the same change for the control firms. I corroborate my findings using major customer identity disclosure and limiting the sample to firms with multiple equity offerings. Results are robust after controlling for information flow from insider trading, institutional investors, and financial analysts. Finally, I document that disclosure of proprietary information leads to a 10–23 percent drop in underpricing. These findings offer new insights into how firms balance the proprietary costs and benefits of disclosure.

This paper presents a costly voluntary disclosure model in which the information quality of a signal about a firm’s future cash flow is unknown, where the information quality, also called signal quality, refers to signal precision. Disclosure plays a dual role in firm valuation, providing information about both the cash flow and signal quality. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which the firm price under disclosure is a nonmonotonic and bounded function of the signal. Under this condition, as the disclosure cost increases, the equilibrium changes from an intermediate pool of undisclosed signals to a low-end pool of undisclosed signals, to two disjoint pools of undisclosed signals, and finally to no disclosure. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when the firm may or may not have private information. Overall, this study offers alternative explanations for the empirical findings of why some firms disclose (withhold) seemingly bad (good) news.

We describe variation in the reporting quality (i.e., accuracy and bias of reported net asset values (NAVs)) of private equity (PE) funds across types of external monitors (investors and auditors) and third-party service providers (valuation specialists, marketers, and administrators). In contrast to public markets, we find only limited evidence that reporting quality varies with the composition and types of investors in PE funds. We observe, however, that reporting quality varies with auditor involvement and the use of third-party service providers; these associations often differ across buyout (BO) and venture capital (VC) funds and from those observed in public markets. Our evidence is important to investors and regulators, especially now that PE supersedes public markets as the main vehicle to raise capital and as regulators increase their focus on private markets. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources listed in the paper.

We examine whether corporate financing activities (CFA) in aggregate convey information about the macroeconomy. Using statement of cash flow information to construct a bottom-up measure of CFA, we find that it has significant predictive power for future economic activity when we exclude a small set of firms whose external financing is largely insulated from macroeconomic conditions. This CFA index has predictive power beyond that of the Gilchrist-Zakrajsek credit spread, aggregate earnings, and other macroeconomic indicators in predicting future GDP in both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting tests. Impulse responses from a structural vector autoregression show that unexpected decreases in this CFA index lead to a large and persistent contraction in economic activity for up to four quarters. Our results suggest that a simple portfolio-based CFA measure helps capture supply-of-capital effects from the financial accelerator mechanism and hence has significant incremental predictive power for real economic activity. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Using GPS location data from customers’ mobile devices, we develop measures of customer shopping behavior intended to capture the likelihood that customers will shop again in the future, and we examine their associations with firms’ financial decisions and outcomes. We measure customers’ propensity to return using the frequency, distance, duration, and timing of their past visits to a firm’s retail locations. We find a positive association between customers’ propensity to return and the persistence of the firm’s revenues and earnings. We also find a positive association between customers’ propensity to return and the efficiency of investing and operating decisions among firms likely to incorporate customer data into their internal information systems. Our results illustrate conditions under which revenues and earnings are sustainable and when managerial decisions are consistent with insights provided by customer information. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Ball and Brown (1968) introduce a method to measure accounting earnings’ contribution to price discovery toward the end-of-period price. Building on this method, we examine a comprehensive set of corporate disclosures and document a large gap in their contribution to annual price discovery between bad and good news years (40 percent versus over 60 percent), despite no such difference in stock return variance (partial R2). These patterns are consistent with managers proactively releasing good news to counteract negative news during bad news years. Our finding broadens the concept of news bundling from concurrent releases to intertemporal dynamics within an annual window. Voluntary press releases are a key driver of this disparity in price discovery, adding 3 percent in bad times while being the top contributor in good times (27 percent). Investor private information acquisition contributes to bridging the gap left by corporate disclosures in price discovery during bad news years. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

We examine how resilient firms’ financial reporting processes are to the sudden death of a Chief Financial Officer (CFO)—a plausibly exogenous shock that allows us to provide insights on the role of the CFO while abstracting away from the endogenous nature of CFO employment. We find that the likelihood of an adverse reporting event—a delayed SEC filing or ex post restatement—doubles in the year following the event, on average. The financial process is less resilient in more complex firms and more resilient in firms with stronger internal controls and highly educated employees. Sudden CEO deaths, in contrast, have no discernible impact on adverse financial reporting events. Collectively, our study highlights the value of the CFO on the financial reporting process as well as potential financial reporting benefits of CFO contingency plans. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.