Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Recruiting talent is a major issue for the accounting profession and is especially salient for small firms with limited resources and brand recognition. In this study, we examine the challenges small accounting firms face when recruiting from universities and the strategies they use to overcome them. Drawing on interviews with 34 stakeholders (primarily recruiting specialists and human resource managers), we develop a process model of small-firm recruiting and present evidence related to each phase: (1) targeting certain universities and students, (2) engaging in university recruiting activities, (3) extending offers, and (4) aiming to evaluate recruiting outcomes. Guided by theory, our findings reveal that small accounting firms develop organizational familiarity and image with students while navigating fatalism and balancing imitation and differentiation in their recruiting strategies. We conclude with a call to reconsider the “biggest is best” assumptions that dominate mainstream accounting research and provide suggestions for future research. Data Availability: Data were obtained from interviews. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M51.

ABSTRACT We examine whether mandatory tax information exchange agreements between governments have real effects on firms’ physical trade in tangible goods. We posit that some of the physical trade in tangible goods flowing through low-tax jurisdictions is intended to facilitate income shifting. As such, shocks to enforcement via mandatory information exchange agreements could cause firms to change the physical flow of goods. Using firm-level shipping container data, we find that adoption of bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) between the U.S. and foreign jurisdictions is associated with significant decreases in the volume of imports by U.S. firms from those jurisdictions. We also find reallocation effects: U.S. firms increase imports from jurisdictions in the same subregion as the treated jurisdiction, resulting in minimal overall change in total imports. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to document a connection among enforcement-related tax disclosure, income shifting, and physical trade flows. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources cited in the paper. JEL Classifications: F14; F18; F23; H25; H26.

ABSTRACT This paper examines how incumbent firms adjust their disclosure behavior in response to heightened labor market competition. Using announcements of large employer entries into local labor markets, I find that incumbent firms located in the affected counties increase the disclosure of positive, forward-looking information. This response is concentrated among incumbent firms that compete more directly with entrant firms for similar workers and is strongest in local labor markets where employee retention pressures are likely to be more severe. Additional analyses show that the response extends to qualitative disclosure, particularly job-related and reputation-enhancing press releases, is associated with more favorable subsequent employment outcomes, and is unlikely to be explained by alternative motives related to productivity spillovers, supply-chain linkages, product market competition, or capital market considerations. Overall, the evidence supports the view that firms use public disclosure to shape employee perceptions and mitigate turnover risk when competition for talent intensifies. Data Availability: Data are available from the public and commercial sources cited in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; D22; J23; J63.

ABSTRACT Macroeconomic forces are challenging the ability of audit firms to sustain engagement profitability. Although one available strategy for multinational clients is to employ non-U.S. firms as component auditors (CAs), the impacts of this choice are unclear. We investigate the influence of CAs on engagement economics in Big 6 audits from 2012 to 2022, a period of increasing non-U.S. labor use. Results show that global hours increase with CA participation, suggesting that additional CA labor is needed to substitute for each U.S. hour. Global billing rates decline, implying that principal auditors share savings from lower cost labor with clients. However, U.S. lead team realizations rise with increasing substitution of non-U.S. labor, incentivizing more extensive CA use. Further analysis shows that these impacts are concentrated in engagements with high CA participation in countries with low wages and low English proficiency. Audit quality is not reduced by greater substitution of non-U.S. labor. JEL Classifications: M40; M42; M48; F66.

ABSTRACT Existing measures of valuation uncertainty are indirect or available for limited samples. We use an accounting-based valuation model to estimate a set of hypothetical intrinsic equity values and measure uncertainty by their spread. We show that our measure reflects both cash flow and discount rate uncertainty, explains price ranges in IPO prospectuses and M&A fairness opinions, and incrementally predicts various future outcomes indicative of uncertainty. An application of our measure to a popular asset pricing context yields new insights into the properties of the value premium. Overall, our paper demonstrates how accounting information can be used to summarize uncertainty about intrinsic equity value. Data Availability: Data used in the article are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; G12; G14.

ABSTRACT We study the effects of mandatory environmental reporting on greenwashing. Our setting is a regulation in the United Kingdom requiring firms to report carbon emissions, or mandatory carbon reporting (MCR). Measuring greenwashing as the discrepancy between companies’ external carbon-related discussions in corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports and their underlying carbon performance, we find MCR leads to a decline in three types of greenwashing: excessive length, over-optimism, and vague commitments, relative to performance. MCR also curtails greenwashing in other (noncarbon) environmental disclosures, suggesting a spillover from MCR to firms’ broader environmental reporting. Drivers are shown to include higher expected reputational and regulatory risks for noncarbon issues after MCR, and a governance spillover, where the governance resources allocated to MCR also benefit noncarbon reporting. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; Q56; G38; Q54.

ABSTRACT Although audit regulators worldwide concur that the rigor of audit firms’ internal engagement quality reviews (EQRs) is paramount to an audit firm’s audit quality, they are concerned that relationships between audit engagement partner (AEP) and engagement review partner (ERP) working in the same firm can undermine these reviews. We utilize confidential proprietary ERP and audit adjustment data to investigate how school alma mater ties between AEPs and ERPs affect audit adjustments in China. Our results reveal that audit adjustments are significantly lower when an AEP and ERP share school ties. This effect is more pronounced when the ERP is less competent than and lacks authority over the AEP, when the ERP and AEP perform mutual reviews or previously coaudited a client, and when the AEP’s work is flawed. Finally, semistructured partner interviews corroborate our empirical findings and strengthen our practical and policy implications. Data Availability: These proprietary data were provided to us with the understanding that it would be used only for independent academic research. Our research team is obligated under nondisclosure and confidentiality conditions to not disclose or share the confidential information which includes all of the data received from the data providers of the Chinese government and not to report information in any article or presentation that would inadvertently reveal (including any potential link) the identity of the partners, firms, their characteristics, and the audit adjustment data. No other restrictions were imposed by the data providers regarding the use of the data purely for academic research purposes and in communicating the research findings. Other data not subject to this confidentiality nondisclosure are available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42.

ABSTRACT Banks often adjust their financial reporting in response to supervisory intervention. However, many banks operate under multiple supervisors with varying preferences. We examine how banks respond to such conflicting oversight within the European Banking Union, where the European Central Bank (ECB) is the central authority. The ECB’s Asset Quality Review revealed that its preferred asset valuations diverged from many banks’ IFRS-compliant practices that were previously accepted by local supervisors. Banks voluntarily aligned their reporting with the nonbinding preferences of the new central supervisor, although the adjustments varied across jurisdictions. Alignment was weaker when central and local supervisory objectives conflicted and stronger when joint supervision mitigated regulatory capture. Overall, these adjustments enhanced the informativeness of loan loss provisioning. With aligned reporting preferences across supervisory layers, the introduction of a central supervisor can thus significantly improve bank reporting and transparency, even without formal enforcement. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources identified in the manuscript. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G20; G21; G28.

ABSTRACT We investigate how incentives provided by whistleblowing programs affect the likelihood of whistleblowing, firm value, and social welfare in the presence of endogenous internal communication. Specifically, we focus on a myopic manager’s ex post decision on internal communication with the employee. An informed employee plays a dual role: working to fix the defect internally or acting as a whistleblower to expose the misconduct if the manager withholds defect information from the public. We find that, when the whistleblowing reward is relatively small, providing stronger incentives increases the likelihood of whistleblowing and can help improve firm value and social welfare. However, once rewards become excessively large and compromise internal communication, contrary to conventional wisdom, the likelihood of whistleblowing declines and both firm value and social welfare decline too. We also characterize the optimal whistleblowing rewards designed by strategic regulators seeking to maximize firm value or social welfare. JEL Classifications: D83; G30; G34; M40.

ABSTRACT We model two competing firms, each operating through their controlled subsidiaries while also holding a minority financial stake in their rival’s subsidiary. Under such cross-ownership, we derive the firms’ optimal disclosure policies, showing how they are affected by technological spillovers, competitive intensity, and the nature of product markets. The results demonstrate that cross-ownership induces more disclosures, benefiting the firm because disclosures promote the profit of its subsidiary (at low spillover values) or the rival’s subsidiary (at high spillover values). The increased transparency under cross-ownership can generate Pareto gains, improving consumer surplus and firm profits relative to separate ownership. This unifying finding holds under quantity and price competition, challenging the view that cross-ownership leads firms to collude, harming consumers. Additionally, with cross-ownership, high-spillover disclosures occur more under price than quantity competition. Thus, price competition can generate Pareto gains, contradicting the view that it favors consumers at the expense of firms. JEL Classifications: D43; D60; D82.