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Does the Disclosure of PCAOB Inspection Findings Increase Audit Firms' Litigation Exposure?

The Accounting Review 2021 96(3), 191-219
We examine whether PCAOB inspection reports increase auditors' litigation risk. We find that inspection reports with audit deficiencies are positively associated with the number of lawsuits subsequently filed against the inspected auditor. These results are strongest when client-level lawsuit-triggering events have already occurred and when PCAOB inspection content is arguably more persuasive. Importantly, these results pertain exclusively to triennially inspected audit firms for which the set of other publicly available signals of audit quality is limited. Furthermore, we do not argue that inspection reports in isolation trigger lawsuits. Instead, once events such as restatement announcements or bankruptcies create the potential for legal action against the auditor, inspection reports provide a public signal about past noncompliance with auditing standards. This signal likely increases lawyers' perceived strength of case against the auditor before the lawsuit is filed and before lawyers have access to the audit workpapers.

Do Auditors View Off-the-Clock Misbehavior by Company Leadership as a Signal of Tone at the Top?

The Accounting Review 2024 99(5), 171-196 open access
We study off-the-clock indiscretion accusations against corporate officers and directors and examine the extent, effectiveness, and context of auditors’ response. In the year that indiscretion allegations are first publicized, auditors charge higher fees and are more likely to resign. Auditors respond to allegations against both top executives and board members. Further, reactions are strongest when allegations demonstrate a lack of individual integrity and, separately, when the audit office has previously audited other similarly accused clients. Importantly, the resulting increase in auditors’ effort partially negates the association between indiscretions and lower financial reporting quality. However, auditors are primarily reactive, rather than proactive, and their response is stronger when the accused client is less important economically. These results suggest that company leadership’s off-the-clock indiscretions are signals to auditors of poor tone at the top, but the audit response is not uniform across all clients.