Firm structure affects incentives and performance. We document significant differences in subprime lending between banks and credit unions prior to and during the Great Recession. In 2006, 23.6% of mortgages from commercial banks were subprime versus only 3.6% of mortgages from credit unions. Moreover, banks were more likely to fail, and had higher delinquency and net charge-off ratios immediately following the financial crisis. Our empirical models control for important differences between credit unions and banks including firm-level characteristics, borrower-level characteristics, and state-level economic conditions. We argue that the remaining difference captures the effects of credit unions’ nonprofit and cooperative structure, which encourages them to internalize the utility of their customer-owners. Our findings explain why credit unions often appear more risk averse relative to commercial banks, a result with important research and policy implications.

We examine whether managerial cognitive heuristics spill over from personal to corporate decisions. We identify “anchoring CEOs” who anchor on the 52-week high in personal stock trading and show that this behavior extends to corporate financial decisions. These CEOs are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings near the 52-week high and place greater weight on the target’s 52-week high in acquisition pricing, with the latter associated with negative abnormal returns. The effect is stronger under competitive pressure and uncertainty but weaker with stronger governance and CEO experience. Our findings highlight cross-domain persistence in managerial heuristics and the role of governance in mitigating behavioral distortions.

About 37% of Chinese listed firms have medical expertise, as measured by the existence of senior executives with a medical degree or medical-industry experience. Using the COVID-19 outbreak in China as a natural experiment, we find that the stock returns of firms with medical expertise, excluding those within the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry, are significantly higher than those without. The positive impact is more pronounced if a CEO or Chairman has medical expertise and if the firm is not state-owned. Overall, this study underlines the importance of diversified executive human capital on firm performance through disentangling macro shocks.

We examine the relative importance of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in determining executive compensation incentives and firm policy, risk, and performance. First, we decompose executive incentives into time-variant and time-invariant firm and manager components. Manager fixed effects supply 73% (60%) of explained variation in delta (vega). Second, controlling for manager fixed effects alters parameter estimates and corresponding inference on observed firm and manager characteristics. Third, larger CEO delta (vega) fixed effects predict better firm performance (riskier corporate policies and higher firm risk). These results suggest that the delta (vega) fixed effect captures managerial ability (risk aversion). (JEL G3, G32, G34, J24, J31, J33) Received September 7, 2018; editorial decision February 21, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

Certification by analysts on a FinTech platform that harnesses the “wisdom of crowds” is associated with successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). We show that favorable ratings by a group of analysts with diverse backgrounds positively predict fundraising success and long-run token performance. Analysts’ ratings also help detect potential fraud ex ante. We document that analysts have career concerns and are incentivized by the platform to issue informative ratings. Overall, our results suggest that a market-based certification process that relies on a diverse group of individuals is at play in financing blockchain startups.

In March 2020, banks faced the largest increase in liquidity demands ever observed. Firms drew funds on a massive scale from preexisting credit lines in anticipation of cash flow and financial disruptions stemming from the advent of the COVID-19 crisis. The increase in liquidity demands was concentrated at the largest banks, who serve the largest firms. Precrisis financial condition did not constrain large banks’ liquidity supply. Coincident inflows of funds from both the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injection programs and depositors, along with strong preshock bank capital, explain why banks were able to accommodate these liquidity demands. (JEL G21, G28) Received June 7, 2020; editorial decision June 23, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.