We quantify the effects of lending and balance sheet channels on corporate investment during large devaluations. We find that if currency crises are accompanied by banking crises, domestic exporters holding unhedged foreign currency debt decrease investment while foreign exporters with better access to credit increase investment despite their unhedged foreign currency debt. We do not find such a differential effect under pure currency crises. Using firm-bank matched data during the global financial crisis, we showthat both domestic and foreign-owned firms experienced a decline in bank credit from affected banks; however, foreign-owned firms substituted the lost credit.

We examine the empirical role of different explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countries—the “Lucas Paradox.” The theoretical explanations include cross-country differences in fundamentals affecting productivity, and capital market imperfections. We show that during 1970–2000, low institutional quality is the leading explanation. Improving Peru's institutional quality to Australia's level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment. Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the specific mechanisms. Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions affect long-run development.

The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models. The fifty U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified ownership of capital and find that capital flows among the states are consistent with the model. Therefore, the small size and “wrong” direction of net international capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders, not to inherent flaws in the neoclassical model.