We exploit staggered changes in state-level corporate tax rates to show that an increase in taxes reduces future innovation. A variety of tests, including those based on policy discontinuity at contiguous counties straddling borders of politically similar states, show that local economic conditions do not drive our results. The effect we document is consistent across the innovation spectrum: taxes affect not only patenting and R&D investment but also new product introductions, which we measure using textual analysis. Our empirical results are consistent with models that highlight the role of higher corporate taxes in reducing innovator incentives and discouraging risk-taking.

Using the staggered introduction of fast-track debt recovery courts in India, we estimate the causal effect of a reduction in debt contract enforcement costs on financing and asset maturity. A reduction in enforcement costs is associated with an increase in long-term debt and a decrease in short-term debt and trade credit. The increase in debt maturity is confined to firms that borrow from multiple lenders, have abnormally short debt maturity structures before the reform, and to smaller firms. Firms also reduce the number of banking relationships, and increase the proportion of long-term assets after the reform.