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The Devil Is in the Details: Implications of Samuel Bowles’s The Moral Economy for Economics and Policy Research

Journal of Economic Literature 2019 57(1), 147-160
All economists should buy and read The Moral Economy by Samuel Bowles. The book challenges basic premises of economic theory and questions policies based on monetary incentives. Incentives not only crowd out intrinsic motivations, they erode the ethical and moral codes necessary for the workings of markets. Bowles boldly suggests that successful policies must combine incentives and moral messages, exploiting complementarities between the two. This essay argues that to achieve this objective, economists must study the local institutions and social context and engage untraditional data to uncover the interplay of incentives and identity.

Identity Economics 2016: Where Do Social Distinctions and Norms Come From?

American Economic Review 2016 106(5), 405-409
Identity economics provides a framework to analyze economic outcomes by establishing people's identities--not just pecuniary incentives--as primary motivations for choice. The heart of the framework is social difference and norms. This paper engages the emerging economic research into sources of divisions and norms: individuals, families, schools, governments, and social movements. The task at hand is to further to develop the micro-foundations of identity, in order to build a socially framed understandings of human motivation that will yield more robust accounts of behavior and institutions and yet better predictions of the implications of policy.

Risk Sharing across Communities

American Economic Review 2007 97(2), 70-74
This paper studies cross-community risk sharing. There is now a large body of theoretical and empirical work on informal insurance, where people mitigate risk by sharing income. A consistent empirical finding is that risk-sharing is not complete within villages, often the observed sets of individuals.2 One reason, researchers suspect, is that risk-sharing does not take place at the village level, but between individuals and families.3 We build a theoretical model where risk-sharing takes place between pairs of agents. There are idiosyncratic shocks to individual income and community-level shocks. We consider how the opportunity for cross-community links affects the shape and efficiency of risk sharing arrangements. We find that when links across villages form, there can be less risk sharing within a village. Welfare is higher for those directly or indirectly connected across villages, but lower for those with no path connecting them to the other village. Overall, welfare can be higher. Thus, empirical findings that insurance within a village is not complete is not necessarily evidence of an inefficient pattern of risk-sharing relations. Rather, the finding is consistent with risk-sharing patterns that involve cross-community relations, and such patterns may yield higher aggregate welfare despite incomplete insurance within a village.

A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks

American Economic Review 2001 91(3), 485-508
This paper introduces a new model of exchange: networks, rather than markets, of buyers and sellers. It begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship, a “link,” to exchange goods. Networks—buyers, sellers, and the pattern of links connecting them—are common exchange environments. This paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks. In a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries, the paper shows that buyers and sellers, acting strategically in their own self-interests, can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare.

Strategic Interaction and Networks

American Economic Review 2014 104(3), 898-930
Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new tools—potential games, optimization, and spectral graph theory—to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of peer effects.

Groupy versus Non-Groupy Social Preferences: Personality, Region, and Political Party

American Economic Review 2017
This paper replicates results that some people, when allocating income, are “groupy” and discriminate between in and out groups, but many show no such bias. The paper explores psychometric, demographic, and political correlates. In an M-Turk experiment, no “Big Five” personality trait relates to this individual difference. Gender, education, and political party are not predictive. Political independents, however, are more likely to be non-groupy, and participants in deindustrialized counties or Deep South Republicans are more likely to be groupy. The results indicate (i) psychological notions of personality do not capture this heterogeneity and (ii) groupiness might relate to political and social contestation.

Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups

American Economic Review 2008 98(2), 212-217
“I want to tell my foreman to f*** off, but I can’t.” So says “Mike,” a steel handler we meet in Stud Terkel’s book Working (1974, xxxv). Many workers’ stories we read in Working and in ethnographies suggest workers greatly resent supervision. As a result, they exert lower effort and may sabotage production. Mike puts dents in the steel. Ethnographies also reveal workers who are not strictly monitored develop work group output norms. This paper uses the con cept of identity to study trade-offs in supervi sory policy. 1 We follow the social psychology literature and examine intrinsic incentives that depend on how workers see themselves in rela tion to the firm. When a supervisor monitors workers, workers adopt an identity in opposition to the firm. The firm gains information and can fine-tune its incentive pay. But resentful workers require high compensation to work in the firm’s interest. With no monitoring, workers are less hostile to the firm. But they may forge a work group identity, with norms that restrict output. We show that a firm may find it profitable to have lax supervision. When workers take on a work group identity, the cost per unit of effort can be lower than when workers view them selves in opposition to the firm. We shall present the model, and then discuss some classic studies of workplaces that portray these trade-offs. Our identity framework synthesizes an emerg ing body of economic theory and empirics on incentives and monitoring (e.g., Bruno Frey 1993; Gary Charness 2000; Daniel S. Nagin et al. 2002; Michael T. Rauh and Giulio Seccia 1 This paper provides a simple formal model of tradeoffs described loosely in Akerlof and Kranton (2005). We also discuss further implications of supervision versus work group cohesion.