This study identifies conditions under which the audit risk model does, and does not, describe audit-planning (investment and pricing) decisions. In an experiment, audit partners and managers examined one of two cases where a material misstatement—error or irregularity—was discovered. The auditors assessed the elements of the audit risk model, assessed business risk and provided recommendations for the audit investment and fee. When the likelihood of an error was high, the audit risk model dominated business risk in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee did not contain a risk premium. When the likelihood of an irregularity was high, business risk dominated the audit risk model in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee contained a risk premium. These results suggest that the ability of the audit risk model to describe auditor behavior and the inclination of auditors to charge a risk premium depend upon the nature of the risks present in the audit. In the presence of errors, the audit risk model adequately described audit-planning decisions; in the presence of irregularities it did not.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy-six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.

Based on data collected from 616 experienced financial officers who use U.S. GAAP or IFRS and are domiciled in the U.S., Europe, or Asia, we examine how reporting standards (U.S. GAAP versus IFRS) and domicile (U.S. versus non-U.S.) affect earnings management (real versus accrual). U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP rely more heavily on real methods than non-U.S. firms that use either IFRS or U.S. GAAP and U.S. firms using IFRS. U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP operate in an environment that encourages real over accruals methods; specifically, U.S. GAAP facilitates detection of earnings management, and enforcement is more effective in the U.S. Further, the likelihood and amount of earnings management do not differ across conditions, suggesting that firms using less accruals earnings management tend to fully compensate by increasing real methods. So stronger reporting environments do not necessarily reduce total earnings management, but instead encourage substitution of real for accruals methods.

We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts' price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and development, analysts' stockprice judgments are not statistically different from their judgments when a company applies pooling-of-interest accounting.

Differentiating real earnings management (REM) from normal business decisions poses a unique challenge for auditors, researchers, and investors. The ambiguity associated with REM, and the fact that REM does not violate GAAP, may explain why its use is on the rise. While some assert that auditors are not, and should not be, concerned with REM, recent research suggests that REM may influence some auditor judgments. Using Correspondent Inference Theory (CIT) as our theoretical framework, we extend REM research by investigating the ways in which auditors respond to REM and how auditors deal with the intrinsic ambiguity associated with REM. We administer a 3×2 between‐subjects experiment to 113 highly‐experienced auditors, manipulating the level of ambiguity surrounding the observed REM (Explicit REM, Potential REM, or No REM) and the earnings context in which the client engages in REM (the client beat or missed the consensus earnings forecast). We find that auditors respond to REM by lowering assessments of management tone (i.e., management's commitment to a culture of high ethical standards), being more likely to discuss the issue with the audit committee, and being less likely to retain the client. Auditors respond to Explicit REM regardless of the earnings context, but respond to Potential (i.e., ambiguous) REM only when the client beats the forecast. Finally, we find that management tone mediates the relation between REM and auditor responses, even after controlling for various audit‐related risks. Thus, for auditors, REM appears to be primarily a “people” issue, as REM provides a negative signal about management.

Auditors often face situations in which acting on their professional obligations comes with potential personal costs. Drawing upon the Theory of Reputation in Organizations, we predict that perceived costs associated with these actions are lower for auditors with positive reputations, which, in turn, influences their actions. In our first experiment, participants perceive that auditors with negative reputations face a more constrained choice set when anticipating a budget overage. Further, participants perceive that those with positive reputations are more likely to proactively report the overage and less likely to underreport hours worked, a result mediated by the anticipated impact on evaluations for “speaking up.” In a second experiment, we manipulate reputation in a live simulation and demonstrate a causal link between reputation and auditors' skeptical action. Taken together, our experiments provide evidence that an auditor's perceived reputation influences their choice to engage in audit quality enhancing behaviors.

Recent research reveals that accruals-based earnings management (AEM) is decreasing while real earnings management (REM) is increasing, suggesting the correlation is due to regulatory scrutiny. However, based on Correspondent Inference Theory, we predict and find that when management uses REM, auditors are more restrictive of management's subjective estimates, making it more difficult for management to use income-increasing AEM. Our experiment manipulates the presence versus absence of REM, and whether the audit difference potentially impacts the client's ability to meet an earnings target. Using a serial mediation model, we find that when auditors observe REM, they perceive these operating decisions as aggressive, leading them to perceive management as aggressive, ultimately causing greater proposed adjustments on an unrelated audit difference. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that when auditors observe REM, their altered perceptions about management can cascade, affecting how they respond to management estimates in unrelated financial statement accounts.

In this study, we examine how information foraging by auditors affects audit evidence collection in two distinct contexts, and show how a small change to audit methodology mitigates the potentially harmful effects of foraging. Information Foraging Theory explains how, while navigating an information environment, individuals learn to acquire information through personally experiencing the costs incurred and the values obtained from information. Consistent with the theory, we find that auditors react to the immediately felt costs of information collection (e.g., time and effort) at the expense of a more global consideration of information value (i.e., auditors collect lower-quality audit evidence). However, foraging behavior is moderated by removing the personal cost to the individual auditor (identifying audit evidence for another member of the audit team to collect), further demonstrating that these personally felt costs influence auditor choices in a way that reduces the quality of information collected. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating how information foraging can influence evidence quality and, thus, audit quality, and how a slight alteration of audit methodology can mitigate this behavior.

This study reports the result of an experiment examining two aspects of the audit context that auditors likely do not suspect can influence audited account balances: the magnitude of an audit difference and the presence of a prior client concession. Negotiation theory shows that negotiators’ initial positions (e.g., clients’ unaudited balances) as well as feelings of reciprocity created by prior negotiations serve to create expectations for the current negotiation and, in turn, affect the outcomes of such negotiations. Our results show that the magnitude of an audit difference involving an estimate (i.e., difference between client’s account balance and the auditor’s independent estimate) as well as the presence of a prior client concession influence auditors’ negotiation expectations. Specifically, auditors proposed smaller adjustments when the magnitude of the audit difference was high and when the client conceded on an audit issue prior to resolving the difference in estimates. These manipulations similarly influence the negotiated outcome, and this influence is fully mediated by the auditor’s initial negotiation position.