Using the model of discretionary disclosure suggested in Verrecchia (1983), I show that an increase in the quality of private information received by a manager results in more disclosure on his part. I also discuss how this result influences a manager's choice over levels of quality.

In the preceding paper Darrough and Stoughton suggest that firm interdependence, modelled as an entry game among firms in a product market, can yield endogenous proprietary costs. This allows the costs associated with the dissemination of information about the firm to depend upon the information's content in some direct way. My comments focus on: first, the structure of the game, which emphasizes the potential for full disclosure; second, the extent to which the entry game exaggerates the usefulness of ‘bad news’; and third, their suggestion that more competition among firms implies more, and not less, disclosure, an observation seemingly contrary to Verrecchia (1983).

This paper considers the role of an agent choosing among reporting alternatives when that choice is unobserved by the principal, and the agent's compensation contract is optimal. The agent is allowed to take post-outcome costly actions which lead to more precise reports of actual profits than would be yielded by less precise, but costless conventional translations of outcomes (e.g., GAAP). The extent to which the principal allows the agent this discretion depends upon the improvement in profits as an indicator of the agent's pre-outcome effort when post-outcome actions take place versus the attendant cost of these actions.

This paper shows how the existence of disclosure-related costs offers an explanation for why a manager exercise discretion in disclsing information even though traders have rational expectations about his motivation to withhold unfavorable reports. In effect, disclosure-related costs introduce noise by extending the range of possible interpretations of withheld information to include news which is actually favorable. Therefore, traders are unable to interpret withheld information as unambiguously ‘bad new’ and thereby discount the value of the firm to the point that the manager is better served to disclose what he knows.

Robert E. Verrecchia, The Use of Mathematical Models in Financial Accounting, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20, Supplement: Studies on Current Research Methodologies in Accounting: A Critical Evaluation (1982), pp. 1-42

Robert E. Verrecchia, On the Relationship Between Volume Reaction and Consensus of Investors: Implications for Interpreting Tests of Information Content, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), pp. 271-283

Partnership, Information systems, Accounting method

Mayers and Rice conjecture that an investor with better information will on average plot above the security market line as drawn by uninformed investors. This paper demonstrates that this conjecture is false in general, by constructing a counterexample. However, the Mayers-Rice conjecture is really part of a much broader hypothesis concerning whether increases in expected returns correspond to increases in expected utilities. It is shown that this latter hypothesis is true when the investor has an exponential or logarithmic utility function.