We study the effect on IPO proceeds of uniform-price restrictions and restrictions on the allocation of oversubscribed issues. Our model suggests that underwriters, given the opportunity to allocate IPOs among both regular and retail investors, would maximize proceeds by using a combination of price and allocation discrimination. Uniform-price restrictions increase the cost of soliciting information from regular investors and, when combined with evenhanded distribution restrictions, make information gathering impossible. We also provide conditions under which either adverse selection or the cost of soliciting information is likely to be the dominant force behind IPO discounting.

In this paper we provide empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that options market makers face risks in managing inventory that are unique to the options markets. In particular, we show that risks associated with the inability to rebalance an option position continuously and uncertainty about the return volatility of the underlying stock each account for a statistically and economically significant proportion of the bid-ask spreads quoted for a sample of Chicago Board Options Exchange options.

Firms that go public produce information that influences the production decisions of their rivals as well as their own production decisions. If information-production costs are borne primarily by pioneering firms, market failures can occur in which both pioneers and followers remain private and make ill-informed investment decisions. Solving this coordination problem requires a transfer between pioneers and followers that leads to a more equitable distribution of information-production costs. We contend that investment banks can enforce such a transfer by effectively bundling IPOs within an industry. This suggests an explanation for clustering of IPOs through time and within industries. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G24, G28, K32.

We study decisions to sell nonexcludable private information in the presence of a trading opportunity. Sell-side agents heighten competition among agents who buy their signals to combine with their own for proprietary trading purposes and thereby promote financial market efficiency. This result holds even when the sell-side production technology is not unique. But sell-side information is subject to underinvestment if producers do not internalize the benefits. The model suggests that fee-based compensation for corporate advisory services diminishes this problem and that market efficiency is undermined by forces steering investment-banking resources toward proprietary trading.

We develop a model in which individual and institutional reputation concerns conflict with one another to study why investment bank reputation concerns may have diminished in recent years. Unproven but talented bankers have incentive to signal their ability through actions that may or may not best serve their clients. In the spirit of Kreps (1990), we treat the bank as a hierarchical firm whose only asset is its institutional reputation for curbing behavior that is suboptimal for the client. The conflict between individual and institutional reputation concerns is more likely to resolve in favor of institutional reputation when firms recruit only the most talented people, and less so when unique ability is especially valuable. We discuss how technological change has contributed to a “star” culture that is unfavorable toward preservation of institutional reputation.

We argue that since bank loans and publicly traded sub-investment-grade debt, or junk bonds, are close substitutes for one another, the recent failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert created a competitive opportunity for commercial banks. Consistent with this hypothesis, we observe within the commercial banking industry a positive wealth effect associated with Drexel′s failure. The distribution of the wealth effect across commercial banks and Drexel′s investment banking rivals is consistent with the wealth effect being primarily a reflection of market expectations of a return to traditional intermediated funding of sub-investment-grade debt. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G2, Financial Institutions and Services.

We estimate the structural links between IPO allocations, pre-market information production, and initial underpricing and find that (1) allocation policies favor institutional investors, both in the US and worldwide; (2) increasing institutional allocations results in offer prices that deviate more from the pre-marketing price range; (3) constraints on bankers’ discretion reduce institutional allocations and result in smaller price revisions, indicating diminished information production; and (4) initial returns are directly related to information production and inversely related to institutional allocations. Our results indicate that discretionary allocations promote price discovery in the IPO market and reduce indirect issuance costs for IPO firms.

The evidence reported in this paper suggests that institutional investors capture a large fraction of the short-run profits associated with IPOs. The favored status enjoyed by institutional investors in underpriced offerings appears, however, to carry a quid pro quo expectation that they will participate in less-attractive issues as well. This finding conforms with the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) prediction that U.S. underwriters behave strategically in the allocation of IPOs.