We quantify the effects of lending and balance sheet channels on corporate investment during large devaluations. We find that if currency crises are accompanied by banking crises, domestic exporters holding unhedged foreign currency debt decrease investment while foreign exporters with better access to credit increase investment despite their unhedged foreign currency debt. We do not find such a differential effect under pure currency crises. Using firm-bank matched data during the global financial crisis, we showthat both domestic and foreign-owned firms experienced a decline in bank credit from affected banks; however, foreign-owned firms substituted the lost credit.

Starting in the early 1990s, countries in southern Europe experienced low productivity growth alongside declining real interest rates. We use data for manufacturing firms in Spain between 1999 and 2012 to document a significant increase in the dispersion of the return to capital across firms, a stable dispersion of the return to labor, and a significant increase in productivity losses from capital misallocation over time. We develop a model with size-dependent financial frictions that is consistent with important aspects of firms’ behavior in production and balance sheet data. We illustrate how the decline in the real interest rate, often attributed to the euro convergence process, leads to a significant decline in sectoral total factor productivity as capital inflows are misallocated toward firms that have higher net worth but are not necessarily more productive. We show that similar trends in dispersion and productivity losses are observed in Italy and Portugal but not in Germany, France, and Norway.

This article studies the transmission of the Global Financial Cycle (GFC) to domestic credit market conditions in a large emerging market, Turkey, over 2003–13. We use administrative data covering the universe of corporate credit transactions matched to bank balance sheets to document four facts: (1) an easing in global financial conditions leads to lower borrowing costs and an increase in local lending; (2) domestic banks more exposed to international capital markets transmit the GFC locally; (3) the fall in local currency borrowing costs is larger than foreign currency borrowing costs due to the co-movement of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) premium with the GFC over time; (4) data on posted collateral for new loan issuances show that collateral constraints do not relax during the boom phase of the GFC.

The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models. The fifty U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified ownership of capital and find that capital flows among the states are consistent with the model. Therefore, the small size and “wrong” direction of net international capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders, not to inherent flaws in the neoclassical model.