Much financial activity is zero-sum. While providing transactional and diversification services to others, participants also prey upon each other. High-ability predators trade opportunistically with less-able prey. In our dynamic model these features amplify real shocks. The presence of more low-ability traders reduces expected losses to high-ability traders, leading to equilibria with high levels of financial activity and employment. Shocks to profits can motivate exit by low-ability traders, rendering those of intermediate skill more vulnerable. Thus, our relatively simple model generates boom-bust dynamics suggestive of Wall Street. (JEL G00, G20, E44)

When monitoring is not contractible—so investors monitor only when, at that time, they expect to benefit from doing so—efficient contracts sometimes induce managers to makefalsereports to investors. Because of monitoring discretion, management misrepresentation can produce Pareto improvements by reducing monitoring costs. When costs of renegotiation are small, optimal contracts necessarily induce misrepresentation. Discretionary monitoring also generates an equilibrium role for multiple-security capital structures. When an optimal contract has two investors, securityholder conflict arises endogenously as a means of reducing monitoring costs. It is efficient to write the contract so that one investor's decision to monitor hurts the other investor.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: G32.

There are numerous aspects concerning financial regulation which the current financial turmoil has high-lighted. These include: (1) the form of deposit insurance; (2) bank solvency regimes, ‘prompt corrective action’; (3) Central Banks’ money market operations; (4) commercial bank liquidity risk management; (5) procyclicality of CARs (and mark-to-market); lack of counter-cyclical instruments; (5) boundaries of regulation, conduits, SIVs and reputational risk; (6) crisis management: (a) within countries, e.g. UK Tripartite Committee; or (b) cross-border, how to allocate the burden of cross-border defaults? This paper describes how the crisis exposed regulatory failings, drawing largely on UK experience, and suggests remedies.

From 2007 to 2016, S&P 500 firms distributed $7 trillion via buybacks and dividends, over 96% of their aggregate net income, prompting claims that “short-termism” is impairing firms’ ability to invest and innovate. We show that, accounting for both direct and indirect equity issuances, net shareholder payouts by all public firms during this period totaled only 41% of net income. And, during this decade, investment substantially increased while cash balances ballooned. In short, S&P 500 shareholder-payout figures cannot provide much basis for the notion that short-termism has been depriving public firms of needed capital. Received September 23, 2018; Editorial decision November 13, 2018; Editor Andrew Ellul

I examine three composite analyst forecast of earnings per share as proxies for expected earnings. The most current forecast weakly dominates the mean and median forecasts in accuracy. This is evidence that forecast dates are more relevant for determining accuracy than individual error. Consistent with previous research, I find analysts more accurate than time-series models. However prior knowledge of forecast errors from a quarterly autoregressive model predicts excess stock returns better than prior knowledge of analysts' errors. This is inconsistent with previous research, and is anomalous given analysts' greater accuracy.

Given the complex and controversial nature of short-selling regulation, we review the academic literature and provide insights for policy makers and academics. We organize the complex history of short-selling regulation into three areas: trading restrictions, securities lending regulations, and disclosure requirements. We identify, analyze, and discuss 45 distinct regulations promulgated from 1896 to 2021, primarily by reviewing the academic literature and the data sources employed. We provide several insights regarding the effectiveness of regulatory approaches and the wider impact of short-selling regulation on markets. (JEL G2, G12, G14, G15, G34)

This is the first paper to examine how the COVID-19 shock transmitted from the asset markets to capital markets. Using a novel measure of the exposure of commercial real estate (CRE) portfolios to the increase in the number of COVID-19 cases (GeoCOVID), we find a one-standard-deviation increase in GeoCOVID on day t-1 is associated with a 0.24 to 0.93 percentage points decrease in abnormal returns over 1- to 3-day windows. There is substantial variation across property types. Local and state policy interventions helped to moderate the negative return impact of GeoCOVID. However, there is little evidence that reopenings affected the performance of CRE markets.

In this paper, we examine the links among banking supervision, the volatility of financial flows, and economic growth. In particular, we explore whether banking regulation mitigates the adverse effects of capital flows volatility on economic growth. Using cross-country data over four decades, we find that banking supervision promotes economic growth by dampening the negative impact of volatile capital flows. The findings hold for both aggregate capital flows and its various components, and for both its net and gross counterparts, while they are also robust for various indicators of regulatory policies. The results support the argument that bank regulatory policy rules designed to ensure financial stability are beneficial to long-run economic growth.

One hesitates to write history as it happens, or to draw policy lessons from current events. The conference took place in May 2008 - after the government-assisted takeover of Bear Stearns but before a capital market downturn fueled a system-wide liquidity crisis, with successive insolvencies at IndyMac, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman, AIG, WaMu, and, as I write, Citigroup. But it would be odd to comment on capital market regulation without mentioning the events of the last three months. I am first to acknowledge that anything I might have written in May would not have foreseen the crisis or linked capital market regulation to financial institutions, which in the US have been conventionally treated as discrete in discourse and institutions (e.g., U.S. Treasury 2008; Leuz and Wysocki 2008).