We argue that hedging and risk management activities of modern corporations arise as a direct consequence of attempts to create shareholder wealth through financial innovation. We formalize this argument by examining in detail corporate issues of foreign currency exchange warrants. We then focus on one multiple issuer to demonstrate how the foreign exchange risk created by the sale of the warrants can be eliminated. The use of off-balance-sheet risk management techniques to lock in the benefits of selling overpriced securities raises questions about the information content of innovative corporate financing decisions.

This paper proposes and implements a security design framework to assess why corporate managers issue convertible debt. We examine three theories that make predictions about the design of convertible debt. Our results suggest that some issuers design convertible debt to mitigate asset substitution problems, while others design it to reduce adverse selection problems. We also find that issuers vary convertible debt security design over the business cycle in response to time variation in asset substitution and adverse selection problems. Overall, the results indicate that corporate managers actively alter convertible debt security design to mitigate costly external finance problems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G32