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Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?

Review of Finance 2023 27(2), 423-467 open access
We test whether measures of influence on regulators affect stress-test outcomes. The large trading banks—those most plausibly Too Big to Fail—face the toughest tests. Supervisory stress tests have a greater effect on large trading banks’ portfolios; the large banks respond by making more conservative (initial) capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. In contrast, while we find little evidence that political or regulatory connections affect the quantitative element of the stress tests, these connected banks do face less scrutiny under its qualitative dimension.

Withdrawn as Duplicate: Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?

Review of Finance 2022 open access
We test whether measures of influence on regulators affect stress test outcomes. The large trading banks—those most plausibly ‘Too Big to Fail’ – face the toughest tests. Supervisory stress tests have a greater effect on large trading banks’ portfolios; the large banks respond by making more conservative (initial) capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. In contrast, while we find little evidence that political or regulatory connections affect the quantitative element of the stress tests, these connected banks do face less scrutiny under its qualitative dimension.

Optimal delegation contract with portfolio risk

Journal of Banking & Finance 2025 171, 107357 open access
Conventional linear benchmarked contracts tend to cause excessive pegging to the benchmark and thus price distortion of stocks in the benchmark. This paper studies the optimal delegation contract when there is principal-agent friction. Specifically, it explores the impacts of incorporating the risk of invested portfolio in the contract on optimal strategies of the principal and the agent as well as on equilibrium asset prices. When agency friction is severe, the optimal contract provides rewards for portfolio risk to improve risk sharing and grants compensation for index return to propel the agent to deviate from pegging to index. In equilibrium, the principal conducts index investment while the agent invests only in individual risky assets, and price distortion caused by agency friction is mitigated.

Do disclosures of selective access improve market information acquisition fairness? Evidence from company visits in China

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 64, 101631 open access
Following an exogenous regulation change in China, we examine the impact of company visit disclosures on the fairness of market information acquisition. Before July 2012, company visits to Chinese listed firms were vaguely disclosed in annual reports long after they were conducted. After that, they were disclosed in detail within two trading days of their completion. Market reactions around visits are much stronger and more predictive of firms' future earnings if visits occurred after July 2012 and, thus, were disclosed in a timelier and more detailed manner. The timely disclosure of visit details also improves the forecast accuracy of non-visiting analysts, reduces forecast dispersion among analysts, and weakens the relative information advantages of visiting analysts. Because of this, visits are more concentrated on firms with poorer information environments, larger sizes, and manufacturing firms after July 2012, i.e., firms offering visitors larger potential benefits. In summary, the timely disclosure of visit details improves the fairness of information acquisition and decreases information asymmetry while causing information chilling effects for firms that provide fewer potential benefits to visitors.