I study the effects of the U.S. fiscal policy response to the Great Recession, accounting for both standard tools and financial sector interventions. A nonlinear model calibrated to the United States allows me to study the state-dependent effects of different fiscal policies. I combine the model with data on the fiscal policy response to find that the fall in consumption would have been one-third larger in the absence of that response, for a cumulative loss of 7.18%. Transfers and bank recapitalizations yielded the largest fiscal multipliers through new transmission channels that arise from linkages between household and bank balance sheets.

We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the risk of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained.