Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally-reported and subsequently-revised financial variables, we study accounting restatements. Our results indicate the worse a bank's financial condition, the more likely it is for originally-reported data to understate financial losses. Also, we find supervisory exams have an important role in uncovering financial problems and prompting accounting restatements to correct loss underreporting. While revisions are directly related to financial difficulties, exam-based restatements are evident at even the earliest stages of deterioration, indicating substantial accounting misstatements—at both banks and other types of companies—can occur well outside severe business circumstances.

Abstract We study nine equity markets between 1900 and 1925 to provide an out-of-sample test of some major asset pricing anomalies during a period in which anomalies had not been documented. We find strong evidence of momentum in almost every market. We find no evidence of long-term reversals, which, coupled with the limited presence of institutional investors, suggests that underreaction should be considered as a key aspect of behavioral theories of momentum. We also find evidence for the size effect, betting-against-beta, and the outperformance of low volatility stocks, whereas we find mixed evidence of short-term reversal. (JEL G12, G15, N20)

The paper presents a model of a monetary economy where there are differences in liquidity across assets. Money circulates because it is more liquid than other assets, not because it has any special function.

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

We use firm-level data to provide some early evidence on the effectiveness of COVID-19 economic policy packages. Our empirical strategy relies on the varying degree of vulnerability to the pandemic across industries. We find a robust association of fiscal support with changes in firm performance indicators (as measured by sales-to-assets ratio, profit margin, interest coverage ratio as well as probability of default) in pandemic-prone sectors. We also observe marginal effects of monetary policy on the sales-to-assets ratio and of foreign exchange intervention on the interest coverage ratio in the hardest-hit firms. These results broadly survive a battery of exercises to address endogeneity. Additionally, we show that firms with a better financial position are more likely to take advantage of the support packages to withstand the pandemic shock. Overall, this preliminary evidence suggests that policy interventions have bought time for the hardest-hit industries, by supporting turnover and improving liquidity.

Version of Record

This paper presents a model that provides an explanation, based on regime switching in the real interest rate and learning, of why tests based on stock-adjustment models, Euler equations, or decision rules—which emphasize short-run fluctuations in inventories and the interest rate—are unlikely to uncover a negative relationship between inventories and the real interest rate. The model, however, predicts that inventories will respond to long-run movements, that is, to regime shifts in the real interest rate. Tests emphasizing cointegration techniques confirm this prediction and show a significant long-run relationship between inventories and the real interest rate.

This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (nonintegration) is that, under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2), whereas under nonintegration he can "fire" (i.e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets. We use this idea to study how changes in ownership affect the incentives of employees as well as those of owner-managers. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract—specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment—under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (nondebt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.