Knowledge that Transforms

Each of 2 Universities-National Bureau of Economic Research Conferences on demographic economics held in 1958 and in 1976 resulted in a volume of essays with great significance for those working in demographic economics. Both are discussed for the 2 sets of essays do much to illustrate what the subdiscipline is doing and neglecting. The 1st dealt nominally with more developed countries and the 2nd purportedly with less developed countries. During the 1st period the dominant idea was neo-Malthusian with emphasis on demographic performance as a consequence of economic progress although in which direction (more children and sooner or fewer children and later) was in part a matter of choosing between the Becker/Mincer formulation of opportunity costs of parenthood and the Easterlin formulation of satisfaction with oneself or alternatively a fear that prosperity was effectively bounded. The book of the 2nd conference includes 9 essays plus a brief introduction by the editor. Each of these essays is reviewed briefly. What is most impressive about this volume are the preferences for the Iron Law of Wages/neo-Malthusian approach -- economic progress leads to demographic response and not the other way around.

PRICES AND QUANTITIES iS the brilliant and disturbing last work of Arthur M. Okun (1928-1980). For more than a decade Okun was the foremost practitioner of macroeconomics in the United States. His critical intelligence at both the theoretical and empirical ends of economics was unsurpassed. These facts were virtually a manufacturer's warranty that the book, whatever its argumentation and evidence, would be significant; we want to know what Okun thought. But this background was no guarantee of an important treatise, and it must have taken some courage to venture a big theoretical work, in an accessible style, on urgent questions. In fact, Okun has delivered a creative and virtuosic study in economic theory. The book's contribution is to provide a complete description of an economy in which rational economic agents consider the distributional consequences of wage and price decisions. The perspective adopted, one which is winning growing favor of late, is contract-theoretic. Because they wish to economize on their costly transactions with one another, people trade repeatedly with the same agent; so trust and fidelity to understandings are important. The ensuing analysis lodges some basic dissents from the informational-expectational paradigm developed over the last score of years. It is particularly stimulating, and troubling, on the main policy controversy of the decade, the question of disinflation.

I wish to dedicate the paper to Mark Perlman, who guided this Journal until now. Perlman's help and encouragement in preparing this paper were characteristically vigorous and scholarly. I wish to express appreciation to the Hoover Institution where an early draft was written and to E. S. Shaw for his comments on that draft. Alex Cukierman, Brian Kantor, Scott Richard, and E. Roy Weintraub made several helpful suggestions, and Karl Brunner suffered through many discussions about Keynes and Keynesians. Many people read and commented on the previous draft, and their suggestions and criticisms have helped me to see points I would have missed. I am grateful especially to Paul Davidson and Donald Moggridge. Davidson commented generously and helpfully on almost every page. Moggridge helped me to strengthen my argument and graciously made available sections of volume 27 of Keynes's Collected Writings that had not been published at the time.