Using a wide sample of international publicly traded firms, this paper studies the rapidly increasing practice of incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that this compensation practice varies at the country, industry, and firm levels in ways that are consistent with efficient incentive contracting. We also observe that reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation arrangements is associated with engagement, voting, and trading by institutional investors, which suggests that firms could be adopting this practice to align their management's objectives with the preferences of certain shareholder groups. Finally, we find that the adoption of ESG Pay is accompanied by improvements in key ESG outcomes, but not by improvements in financial performance.

Exploiting the unique features of the CDP, the world-leading platform of corporate climate risk disclosures, we study the relationship between institutional investors' demand for climate-related information (as reflected in their CDP signatory status), firms' decision to disclose this information, and corporate carbon emissions. We provide systematic international evidence that ownership by CDP signatories is positively associated with the probability of disclosing information to the CDP, and that such disclosure is associated with subsequent lower carbon emissions. We also observe that CDP signatories are more likely to engage with and divest from top emitters disclosing to the CDP. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that investor demand for climate-related information results in greater corporate disclosure and contributes to firms’ decisions to lower future carbon emissions.

Golden parachutes (GPs) have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more than two decades. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums and that this association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs on executive incentives. However, we also find that firms that adopt GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns both during and subsequent to the period surrounding their adoption. This finding raises the possibility that even though GPs facilitate some value-increasing acquisitions, they do have, on average, an overall negative effect on shareholder wealth; this effect could be due to GPs weakening the force of the market for control and thereby increasing managerial slack, and/or to GPs making it attractive for executives to go along with some value-decreasing acquisitions that do not serve shareholders' long-term interests. Our findings have significant implications for ongoing debates on GPs and suggest the need for additional work identifying the types of GPs that drive the identified correlation between GPs and reduced shareholder value.