Knowledge that Transforms

Version of Record

Portfolio Choices of Parents and Their Children as Young Adults: Asset Accumulation by African-American Families by Ngina S. Chiteji and Frank P. Stafford. Published in volume 89, issue 2, pages 377-380 of American Economic Review, May 1999

This paper constructs a model of the transfer paradox for a small open economy with nontraded goods. It demonstrates that increased production of nontraded goods can change their domestic price so as to offset the otherwise beneficial effect of aid and, under certain conditions, to create a transfer paradox even in a small country. The model is estimated with time-series data for 44 aid-dependent countries for the period 1970–1990. The results support the model and show that the nontraded goods expansion effect is more likely to cause immiserization than Johnson's tariff-distorting export-displacement effect.

Income Distribution in Urban China during the Period of Economic Reform and Globalization by Azizur Rahman Khan, Keith Griffin and Carl Riskin. Published in volume 89, issue 2, pages 296-300 of American Economic Review, May 1999

Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, China has experienced the largest increase in income inequality of all countries for which comparable data are available. According to the World Bank (1997), China’s Gini coefficient increased from 28.2 in 1981 to 38.8 in 1995 based on official survey data. Another study that used internationally standard definitions for incomes estimated China’s Gini ratio at 38.2 in 1988 and 45.2 in 1995, a level that already surpassed many developing economies in Asia (Azizur Khan and Carl Riskin, 1998). Are these income inequality changes the consequence of institutional reforms that replaced egalitarian rewards with work incentives, employment contracts, and labor mobility? This paper uses household survey data collected by China’s State Statistical Bureau (SSB) to investigate the sources and causes of this rising inequality. By analyzing Gini ratios and generalized entropy measures, I decompose the overall inequality into three sectoral components: ( i ) inequality within rural areas, ( ii ) inequality within urban areas, and (iii ) sectoral disparity. The data indicate that increases in rural – urban income differentials have been the driving factor behind the rising overall inequality in China. I argue that urbanbiased policies and institutions, including labor mobility restrictions, welfare systems, and financial policies of inflation subsidies and investment credits to the urban sector, are responsible for the long-term rural–urban divide and the recent increases in disparity.

Is the Impact of Health Shocks Cushioned by Socioeconomic Status? The Case of Low Birthweight by Janet Currie and Rosemary Hyson. Published in volume 89, issue 2, pages 245-250 of American Economic Review, May 1999

Psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures (e.g. Shelly E. Taylor and J.D. Brown, 1988; Neil D. Weinstein, 1980). When assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait-- like driving ability (Ola Svenson, 1981 ), income prospects, or longevity-- a vast majority of people say they are above the average, although of course, only half can be (if the trait is symmetrically distributed). This paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting-- entry into competitive games or markets. Many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years. For example, using plant level data from the U.S. Census of Manufacturers spanning 1963-1982, Timothy Dunne et al. (1988) estimated that 61.5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79.6 percent exited within 10 years. Most of these exits are failures (see also Dunne et al., 1989a, 1989b; D. Shapiro and R.S. Khemani, 1987).

The Medicare program of health care for the aged now costs more than $5, 000 per enrollee, a national cost of more than $200 billion a year. The official projections that these costs will rise rapidly from 2.5% of GDP now to 5.5% of GDP in 2030 and 7% of GDP in 2070 assume that structural changes in health care will prevent the even more rapid growth of spending that would occur if past trends continue. These GDP shares are equivalent to increasing the payroll tax rates that rise from 5% of total wages now to 14% of total wages by 2070. Alternatively, if the increased Medicare spending is financed by an across-the-board increase in income tax rates, all tax rates would rise by 46 percent (e.g., from 28% to 41%). If Medicare costs continue to be tax financed, the sharp increase in Medicare costs would cause a substantial increase in the deadweight loss of the tax system. Even with quite favorable assumptions, the increased deadweight loss is likely to be almost as large as the direct increase in the health care costs themselves. This paper analyzes an alternative life cycle approach to paying for the cost of health care of the aged: a system of investment-based individual Retiree Health Accounts (RHAs) to which the government deposits funds during individuals' working years. At retirement the individual could use the accumulated fund to purchase a fee-for-service plan like the current Medicare package, to pay for membership in an HMO, or to establish a medical savings account with a high deductible insurance policy. Using data from the Social Security administration, I estimate that annual RHA deposits equal to about 1.4% of total payroll would eventually be enough to pay for the full increase in the cost of Medicare, obviating a nine percentage point payroll tax increase.

This paper studies a general-equilibrium model of a dynamic economy with menu costs. Each firm's productivity is exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks around a trend, and the money supply to monetary shocks around a trend. All consumption, pricing, and production decisions are based on optimizing behavior. There exists a staggered Markov perfect equilibrium with prices determined by a two-sided (s, S) markup strategy. The paper analyzes the optimal markup strategy and investigates the dynamics of the price index and the aggregate output. The welfare consequences of the uncertain aggregate productivity and money supply are also examined.

I develop a model in which a firm's only asset is its name, which summarizes its reputation, and study the forces that cause names to be valuable, tradeable assets. An adverse selection model in which shifts of ownership are not observable guarantees an active market for names with either finite or infinite horizons. No equilibrium exists in which only good types buy good names. The reputational dynamics that emerge from the model are more realistic than those in standard game-theoretic reputation models, and suggest that adverse selection plays a crucial role in understanding firm reputation.