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Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facilities

Journal of Political Economy 1976 84(6), 1239-1259
The reasons for the shift from private to public ownership of urban transit facilities are the subject of the paper. The regulation theory suggests that this shift is due to the increasing severity of regulation, while the declining-market and externalities hypotheses suggest that increases in automobile ownership are the reason for reduced profits and public ownership. Regression results indicate that profit margins of privately owned systems are higher when regulation is by a state rather than a local agency. Changes in profit margins over time are found to be directly related to increases in automobile ownership.

Money and Economic Activity in the Open Economy: The United Kingdom, 1880-1970

Journal of Political Economy 1976 84(5), 979-1012
This paper presents a highly aggregated structural macroeconomic model of the U.K. economy. The specification is based on the insights provided by recent theoretical work on the working of open economies, and provides the most complete answer yet offered on the reverse causation controversy in monetary economics. The key empirical findings include relatively high interest rates and price elasticities in the relevant behavioral equations and a significant disequilibrium real balance effect on a broad expenditure aggregate. The results of simulation analysis of the model are reported and throw light on Britain's relatively poor postwar macroeconomic performance.

Destabilizing Speculation: A General Equilibrium Approach

Journal of Political Economy 1976 84(1), 101-108
Friedman's proposition that destabilizing speculators must lose money is easily proved with partial equilibrium analysis. But this analysis proves too much. In a general equilibrium analysis, assuming speculation implies institutional arrangements for borrowing goods one period and repaying them the next, one party must gain and the other party and the whole community lose from destabilizing speculation; but whether the initiator gains or loses depends on tastes and the commodity denomination of the contract.

Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach

Journal of Political Economy 1976 84(2), 317-329
This paper utilizes an economic model to analyze the determinants of legislative decision making. The model is empirically tested using the statistical technique of n-chotomous multivariate probit analysis. The legislative issue addressed is the 1973 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The amendment proposed to increase the minimum wage and the number of workers covered. The dependent variable denotes a representative's voting pattern on the minimum wage; the independent variables represent economic characteristics of a legislator's congressional district. The hypothesized linkages between the set of independent variables and legislative voting patterns were generally substantiated in the empirical tests.

Economic Development in Communist China

Journal of Political Economy 1976 84(2), 239-264
This text is an extension of a previous study, covering the period from the 1930s to 1959, published by the present writer in 1965. The results of the earlier study (amended) are included in the final table. Economic progress was violently interrupted by "The Year of the Great Leap Forward" (1958), when, as a result of misinformation about agricultural labor requirements and hysterically falsified statistics, it was claimed that agricultural output was being doubled in 1 year, and that immense transfers of labor to other employments were immediately possible. The result was acute agricultural shortages, indeed famine in 1960-61, and complete disruption of industrial production. Recovery from these disasters took several years. A lesser interruption (to industry but not to agriculture) took place in the "Cultural Revolution" of 1966-67. Those to whom the idea of a labor shortage in China appears paradoxical must be reminded that China has few draft animals and still fewer tractors. To cultivate a country the size of China with hand hoes requires several hundred million workers. Chinese population is probably substantially lower than is generally believed, and almost certainly has not been expanding at the rate of 2 percent per year frequently attributed to it. Famine conditions in the early 1960s caused a considerable reduction in the rate of population growth. Publication of Chinese official statistics virtually ceased in 1959, and sources of information for subsequent years are indirect and complex. The basis of the methods used is the construction of estimates of agricultural output and industrial production index numbers, supplemented by information about employment and wages. Almost all attempts hitherto to state China's (and other developing countries') national product in dollar terms give results considerably too low. The yuan has a high purchasing power over services and over some labor-intensive commodities. For a true comparison all Chinese consumption of food should also be revalued at U.S. retail prices. On this basis Chinese 1971 gross product per head, expressed in U.S. dollars of 1974 purchasing power, was 154 for food, 140 for other private consumption, and 157 for investment and government services, or 451 in all. The long-run rate of increase of real gross product per head of population has been about 2 percent per year, whether we take the 1930s or the early 1950s as our starting point. This rate is a little below the general average for developing countries, and much less than is usually claimed. Inequalities in income distribution in China are also not very different from those prevailing in other countries.