Knowledge that Transforms

We propose a new approach to the international comparison of real GDP, as measured from the output-side. The traditional Gary-Khamis system, which measures real GDP from the expenditure-side, is modified to include differences in the terms of trade between countries. It is shown that this system has a strictly positive solution under mild assumptions. On the basis of a sample of 151 countries in 1996, it is shown that differences between real GDP measured from the expenditure-side and output-side can be substantial, especially for small open economies. We also obtain cross-country measures of “real openness” and the terms of trade.

Two papers published in this journal (Jantti, 1994, and Mocan, 1999), among others, find empirical evidence that “increases in structural unemployment have a substantial aggravating impact on income inequality.” The main point of this work is to show that standard job-search models can help us understand this empirical regularity. As a byproduct of the analysis, the paper also provides a closed-form general expression that enables direct calculation of the Gini coefficient of wage-income inequality as a function of any arbitrary initial distribution of wage offers. Three numerical examples illustrate the results.

We introduce two simple new variants of the jackknife instrumental variables (JIVE) estimator for overidentified linear models and show that they are superior to the existing JIVE estimator, significantly improving on its small-sample-bias properties. We also compare our new estimators to existing Nagar (1959) type estimators. We show that, in models with heteroskedasticity, our estimators have superior properties to both the Nagar estimator and the related B2SLS estimator suggested in Donald and Newey (2001). These theoretical results are verified in a set of Monte Carlo experiments and then applied to estimating the returns to schooling using actual data.

The contingent valuation method for estimating willingness to pay for public goods typically adopts a single referendum question format, which is relatively statistically inefficient. As an alternative, Cooper, Hanemann, and Signorello (2002) propose the one-and-one-half bound (OOHB) format, allowing researchers to question respondents about both a lower and higher limit on project costs, thereby securing substantial gains in statistical efficiency. Using an experimental design, we find that responses to OOHB valuation questions fail crucial tests of procedural invariance. We test various competing models of observed response patterns including strategic misrepresentation of standard preferences and nonstandard models of preference formation.

We exploit variation in gasoline and cigarettes taxes in adjacent political jurisdictions for northern Illinois and Indiana to examine consumers' trade-off between prices and travel. We develop a model that relates activity in the retail gasoline industry around the tax borders to consumer locations. Our results indicate that the willingness of a typical Chicagoland consumer to travel an additional mile to buy gasoline corresponds to about $0.065 to $0.084 per gallon. According to our estimates, the observed area of Chicago, the jurisdiction with the highest taxes, is missing approximately 40% of the capacity that would exist were taxes equalized.

We propose an industry-level index of capital resalability—the share of used capital in aggregate industry capital expenditure—that relates (inversely) to sunkenness of investments. Using data from U.S. manufacturing, we then test the effect of capital resalability on industry productivity dispersion, mean productivity, and industry concentration. As predicted by standard models of industry equilibrium with heterogeneous firms, we find that increases in capital resalability are associated with a reduction in productivity dispersion, and an increase in the mean and median of the productivity distribution. Furthermore, we find that capital resalability is negatively correlated with industry concentration.

I first replicate Donohue and Levitt's results for violent and property crime arrest rates. I apply their data and specification to an analysis of age-specific homicide rates and murder arrest rates. The coefficients on the abortion rate have the wrong sign for two of the four measures of crime and none is statistically significant at conventional levels. I then use the legalization of abortion in 1973 to exploit two sources of variation: between-state changes in abortion rates before and after Roe, and cross-cohort differences in exposure to legalized abortion. I find no meaningful association between abortion and age-specific crime rates.

Alwyn Young (2000) argues that barriers to interprovincial trade in China have increased during the reform period. This paper critically examines each of his five arguments and the evidence he presents. In all five instances, the argument is problematic and the evidence not robust. A comparison with the United States shows the Chinese evidence to be well within the range of that of a normal, relatively integrated large economy.

An important issue with conducting economic analysis in the lab is whether the results generalize to real-world environments where the stakes and subject pool are considerably different. We examine data from the game show The Weakest Link to determine whether the gender of one's opponent affects performance. We then attempt to replicate the competitive structure of the game show in the lab with an undergraduate subject pool. The results in the lab only match when we both employ high stakes in the lab (≥ $50) and limit our analysis to young contestants in the game show (age < 33).

This paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using California's Proposition 209, which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state-funded contracts. After Proposition 209, prices on state-funded contracts fell by 5.6% relative to federally funded projects, for which preferences still applied. Most of the price decline after Proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed, which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high-minority areas. Finally, short-run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action.