American Economic Review2010100(4), 1892-1912open access
The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of coordination experiments with a total of 1,101 participants. We find that teams of three subjects each coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.
American Economic Review2010100(2), 224-228open access
Low Skilled Immigration and Work-Fertility Tradeoffs among High Skilled US Natives by Delia Furtado and Heinrich Hock. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 224-28 of American Economic Review, May 2010
Medicare Part D began coverage of prescription drugs in 2006. Rather than setting pharmaceutical prices, the government contracted with private insurers to provide drug coverage. Theory suggests that additional insured consumers will raise the optimal price of a branded drug, while the insurer's ability to move demand to substitute treatments may lower prices. We estimate the program's effect on the price and utilization of pharmaceutical treatments. We find that Part D enrollees paid substantially lower prices than while uninsured, and increased their utilization of prescription drugs. We find relative price declines only for drugs with significant therapeutic competition.
American Economic Review2010100(2), 408-413open access
Wholesalers and Retailers in US Trade by Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 408-13 of American Economic Review, May 2010
American Economic Review2010100(2), 475-479open access
Buying or selling a residential property is one of the most important financial decisions for a large majority of households in the United States. In 2007, 68 percent of households owned their own home, more than a third of national wealth was held in residential real estate, and there were 6.4 million sales of existing homes according to estimates from the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent than if rational expectations are assumed.
Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets.
American Economic Review2010100(2), 368-372open access
For most people, buying a house is one of the most significant investment decisions of their lifetimes. Economists have mainly focused on the consumption aspects of this process. For example, a typical model in urban economics might frame the decision of where to live as a discrete choice over a bundle of housing and neighborhood attributes such as location, square footage, schooling options, and crime levels. The investment side of the problem has received considerably less attention, a surprising omission since housing assets comprise approximately two-thirds of the average American household’s financial portfolio, serve an important role in saving for retirement and, as has become increasingly apparent, can be quite risky. This paper views housing markets from an asset-pricing perspective, using finance theory to relate the risk premium of a housing asset (the difference between its expected return and the return for a risk-free investment) to its exposure to risk. As usual in finance, what matters for the risk premium of a housing asset is its exposure to systematic risk, not idiosyncratic risk. In our model, there are two forms of systematic risk to which housing assets are exposed: national risk (which is common to houses everywhere) and local risk (which affects all houses within a given metropolitan area, but nowhere else). Houses are said to be of the same type h if they are located in the same metropolitan area and have the same exposure to systematic risk. Our main conclusions are that (1) houses of every type face a common set of risk prices ( for the national risk and m for the local risk specific to metropolitan area m) that, together with appropriate measures of exposure to risk,
American Economic Association Universal Academic Questionnaire Summary Statistics by Charles E. Scott and John J. Siegfried. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 647-50 of American Economic Review, May 2010
The extensive investigation of the contribution of teachers to student achievement produces two generally accepted results. First, there is sub stantial variation in teacher quality as measured by the value added to achievement or future aca demic attainment or earnings. Second, variables often used to determine entry into the profession and salaries, including post-graduate schooling, experience, and licensing examination scores, appear to explain little of the variation in teacher quality so measured, with the exception of early experience. Together these findings underscore explicitly that observed teacher characteristics do not represent teacher quality.