Knowledge that Transforms

We exploit an exogenous shock to analyst coverage as a result of brokerage house mergers and closures to examine whether financial analysts influence the tax‐planning activities of the firms they cover. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that, on average, firms affected by broker mergers and/or closures experience a reduction in their GAAP (cash) effective tax rates (ETR) of 2.5 percent (2.6 percent), relative to control firms, translating into average tax expense (cash tax) savings of $34 ($35) million. The treatment effect is more pronounced among firms with lower pre‐event analyst coverage. To explore how analysts affect tax planning, we further document that the treatment effect is greater among firms that lose an analyst who provided an implied ETR forecast in the past, suggesting that analysts influence tax planning via their tax‐specific research efforts. In addition, we find that after merger/closure, weakly governed firms increase their use of aggressive tax strategies, and financially distressed firms experience a larger reduction of cash effective tax rates, relative to control firms. Overall, we provide evidence that a shock to analyst coverage sufficiently changes the cost‐benefit trade‐off of tax planning.

This study investigates how transfer pricing risk affects the premiums in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Differences in the rigor of transfer pricing enforcement and the severity and clarity of rules across countries create differential risk of material costs for multinationals as they expand globally. We use 448 country‐level transfer pricing risk assessments by global transfer pricing partners and managers from two firms in 33 countries to develop a metric of country‐year transfer pricing risks. The resulting measure of transfer pricing risk is used to analyze the premiums of 3,103 cross‐border M&A from 2000 to 2012. We find that lower bid premiums are associated with higher transfer pricing risk in the target's country. We find the relation is stronger when expected future transfer pricing benefits are larger. Our results, consistent with the views of experts in the field, provide the first archival evidence that acquirers consider synergies created by future tax planning when estimating the value of a target.

This paper examines the effect of regulations (i.e., the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and Regulation G) on both the timing of earnings announcements and their relative informational role. I find that after the regulation of earnings announcements was instituted, firms began issuing less timely earnings announcements, and those announcements have become more important for shareholders. Ceteris paribus, after the regulations, firms have disclosed their fiscal year‐end announcements more than four days later than they had prior to regulatory changes. My results are robust to sensitivity analyses that control for concurrent earnings announcement disclosures and other changes instituted by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act. Further, I find evidence suggesting that the relative informational role of earnings announcements has increased significantly in the post‐regulation period. This study highlights a shift in both the timeliness and investor perceptions of earnings announcements spurred by the implementation of regulatory oversight, indicating a trade‐off of timeliness for relevance.

Using a propensity score matched sample and a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that stock price crash risk increases after a firm voluntarily incorporates clawback provisions in executive officers' compensation contracts. This heightened crash risk is concentrated in adopters that increase upward real activities‐based earnings management and those that reduce the readability of 10‐K reports. Based on cross‐sectional analyses, we also find that the increased crash risk is more pronounced for adopters with high ex ante fraud risk, low‐ability managers, high CEO equity incentives, and low dedicated institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that the clawback adoption per se does not curb managerial opportunism but rather induces managers to use alternative channels for concealing bad news, which may contribute to a greater stock price crash risk; and the increase in crash risk is more likely in cases where incentives are strong or monitoring is weak. Our results should be of interest to regulators and policymakers considering the effects of clawback adoption on the investing public.

Increasing financial statement complexity along with an intense focus on audit quality has created challenges for today's auditors. As a result, audit firms are increasingly relying on various specialists to help them perform their audits. To better understand why and how audit firms are using forensic specialists on their audits, we conduct an exploratory survey of experienced audit and forensic professionals. Our results suggest auditors are largely relying on forensic specialists to provide them with additional comfort beyond that obtained from traditional audit procedures. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that the usage of forensic specialists occurs primarily on riskier engagements, such as those involving restatements, initial public offerings, and investigations by regulators or law enforcement agencies. Although their involvement varies, forensic specialists assist audit teams by providing both guidance and direct assistance across the audit in areas including fraud brainstorming, design of procedures to test for fraud, and review of results of fraud‐related testing. In addition, our findings indicate forensic specialist involvement may lead to greater comfort as evidenced by the perceived identification by forensic specialists of additional audit findings related to material misstatements, financial reporting fraud, misappropriation of assets, and internal control deficiencies. Our results also reveal the majority of auditor and forensic specialist participants believe the value of forensic involvement on audits outweighs the associated costs, even in the absence of such additional audit findings. We conclude our paper by offering a theoretical discussion of our findings based on the audit comfort framework and suggestions for future research. In summary, our findings suggest that the discomfort some auditors feel in the contemporary auditing environment is leading to changes in the rituals that underlie traditional audits such that they seek comfort afforded them through forensic specialist involvement.

National policies take varied approaches to encouraging university- based innovation. This paper studies a natural experiment: the end of the “professor's privilege” in Norway, where university researchers previously enjoyed full rights to their innovations. Upon the reform, Norway moved toward the typical US model, where the university holds majority rights. Using comprehensive data on Norwegian workers, firms, and patents, we find a 50 percent decline in both entrepreneurship and patenting rates by university researchers after the reform. Quality measures for university start-ups and patents also decline. Applications to literature on university technology transfer, innovation incentives, and taxes and entrepreneurship are considered.

We develop a structural model to investigate the effects of pharmaceutical price regulation on demand and on manufacturers’ price-setting behavior in France. We estimate price-cost margins in a regulated market with price constraints and infer whether these constraints are binding, exploiting cost restrictions across drugs, which come from observing the same drugs in potentially price-constrained markets (France) and in markets where prices are unregulated (United States and Germany). Our counterfactual simulations suggest that price constraints generated modest savings for anti-ulcer drugs in 2003–2013 (2 percent of total expenses), relative to a free pricing scenario, and shifted consumption from generic to branded drugs.

The platform design, the process that helps potential buyers on the internet navigate toward products they may purchase, plays a critical role in reducing search frictions and determining market outcomes. We study a key trade-off associated with two important roles of efficient platform design: guiding consumers to their most desired product while also strengthening seller incentives to lower prices. We use simple theory to illustrate this, and then combine detailed browsing data from eBay and an equilibrium model of consumer search and price competition to quantitatively assess this trade-off in the particular context of a change in eBay's marketplace design.

We study how the recent housing boom and bust affected college enrollment during the 2000s. We exploit cross-city variation in local housing booms, which improved labor market opportunities for young men and women. We find that the boom lowered college enrollment, with effects concentrated at two-year colleges. The decline in enrollment during the boom was generally reversed during the bust; however, attainment remains persistently low for particular cohorts, suggesting that reduced educational attainment is an enduring effect of the recent housing cycle. The housing boom can account for approximately 25 percent of the recent slowdown in college attainment.

Weyl (2010) shows that in multi-sided platform settings, profit maximization leads to classical and Spence distortions, with the Spence distortion providing a new explanation for why prices may sometimes be too high (or too low) on platforms. However, the key formulas that Weyl gives comparing privately and socially optimal prices are misstated. Properly interpreted, his results only explain marginal incentives with respect to setting prices but not the total distortion in prices, which can be very different.