This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.

Using a new database, we study fees charged by 46,580 mutual fund classes offered for sale in 18 countries, which account for about 86% of the world fund industry in 2002. We examine management fees, total expense ratios, and total shareholder costs (including load charges). Fees vary substantially across funds and from country to country. To explain these differences, we consider fund, sponsor, and national characteristics. Fees differ by investment objectives: larger funds and fund complexes charge lower fees; fees are higher for funds distributed in more countries and funds domiciled in certain offshore locations (especially when selling into countries levying higher taxes). Substantial cross-country differences persist even after controlling for these variables. These remaining differences can be explained by a variety of factors, the most robust of which is that fund fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protection.

This paper examines the value of sell-side analysts to covered firms by documenting the effects on firm performance and investor interest after a complete loss of analyst coverage for periods of at least one year. We find that analyst coverage adds value to a firm both because it reduces information asymmetries about the firm's future performance and because it maintains investor recognition for that firm's stock. After the introduction of regulations that curtailed the informational advantage of analysts in the early 2000s, the investor recognition role of analysts remains important. Firms that lose all analyst coverage continue to suffer a significant deterioration in bid-ask spreads, trading volumes, and institutional presence but do not show a significant difference in subsequent performance relative to covered peers. In addition, controlling for other factors, we find that firms that lose all analyst coverage for one year are significantly more likely to delist than their covered peers. Our results provide insight into the reasons why firms place so much importance on analyst coverage.

This study examines the determinants of mutual fund mergers and their subsequent wealth impact on shareholders of target and acquiring funds. Results indicate significant improvements in postmerger performance and a reduction in expense ratios for target fund shareholders. In contrast, acquiring fund shareholders experience a significant deterioration in postmerger performance. The net asset flows continue to remain negative for the combined fund in the year following the merger. The likelihood of a fund merger is inversely related to fund size for both within‐and across‐family mutual fund mergers. However, poor past performance is a significant determinant for only within‐family mergers.

We investigate stock price reactions to Internet-related name changes in a market downturn. In contrast to the Internet boom period, during which there was a surge of dot.com additions, in the bust period, there is a dramatic reduction in the pace of dot.com additions accompanied by a rapid increase in dot.com name deletions. Following the Internet “crash” of mid-2000, investors react positively to name changes for firms that remove dot.com from their name. This dot.com deletion effect produces cumulative abnormal returns on the order of 64% for the 60 days surrounding the announcement day. Our results add support to a growing body of literature that documents that investors are potentially influenced by cosmetic effects and that managers rationally time corporate actions to take advantage of these biases.