We provide evidence on the valuation of equity positions by hedge funds. Reported valuations deviate from standard valuations based on closing prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices for roughly 7% of the positions. These equity valuation deviations are positively related to illiquidity and price volatility of the underlying stocks. They respond to past performance and intensify after an advisor starts reporting to a commercial database. Furthermore, advisors with more valuation deviations show a stronger discontinuity in their reported returns around 0, manage a higher fraction of potentially fraudulent funds, report smoother returns, and exhibit an upward spike in their December reported returns.

We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.

Firms’ competitive advantages are unsustainable when competitors hire their employees away to study and recreate those advantages. We document inter-firm knowledge spillovers through labor mobility in the mutual fund industry, which result in performance improvement at the recipient family. This effect intensifies when frictions hampering knowledge absorption at the recipient family are weaker and switching managers had better access to the organization processes at the originating family. Performance deterioration at the originating family, which intensifies when more money chases the newly-transferred knowledge, suggests erosion of its competitive advantage and wealth transfers across investors in the respective families.

This study examines how the efficiency of trading desks operated by mutual fund families affects portfolio performance and investment behavior of affiliated funds. We estimate the trading efficiency of a fund family's trading desk as the difference between the gross return of the family's index fund, which incorporates trading costs, and the return of the underlying index, which does not incorporate trading costs, around index adjustment dates. By operating more efficient trading desks that help reduce trading costs, fund families improve the performance of their funds significantly and also enable their funds to trade more and hold less liquid portfolios.

We investigate the term structure of bond market illiquidity premia and show that the term structure varies greatly over time. Short and long end are strictly separated suggesting that different economic factors drive different parts of the term structure. We propose a stylized theoretical model which implies that current trading needs of investors determine the short end. The long-term risk of being forced to liquidate bond positions determines the long end. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. While short-term liquidation risk captured by asset market volatilities drives the short end, the long end depends on the long-term economic outlook.

Human capital acquired while working in other industries before joining fund management provides fund managers with an information advantage. Fund managers exploit this advantage by overweighting their experience industries and by picking outperforming stocks from these industries. These managers’ superior information is impounded into stock prices slowly, suggesting that their information is unique and takes a while to be discovered by the markets. Families exploit their manager’s industry-specific human capital by broadly employing their investment ideas in other funds. The investment value of industry experience is unaffected by whether or not the manager with such experience is in a team. Received August 25, 2016; editorial decision December 24, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We examine how labor mobility restrictions in the form of non-compete clauses in employment contracts affect employee behavior. Using the mutual fund industry as testing laboratory, we show that fund managers respond to higher job termination costs due to increased enforceability of non-compete clauses by increasing their contribution to their employer's revenue. They do so by improving their fund performance, while also increasing window dressing to attract new customers and increase fee revenue. Furthermore, the change in incentives disciplines managers’ risk taking, as shown by noticeable reductions in their portfolio risk, portfolio deviations from peers, and engagement in fund tournaments.