Beginning in 1997, the price of concert tickets took off and ticket sales declined. From 1996 to 2003, for example, the average concert price increased by 82%, while the CPI increased by 17%. Explanations for price growth include (1) the possible crowding out of the secondary ticket market, (2) rising superstar effects, (3) Baumols and Bowen's disease, (4) increased concentraion of promoters, and (5) the erosion of complementarities between concerts and album sales because of file sharing and CD copying. The article tentatively concludes that the decline in complementarities is the main cause of the recent surge in concert prices.

In the absence of perfect annuity markets, individual consumers generally undertake precautionary saving to provide resources for their future consumption in the event that they live longer than expected. Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (in this issue) (hereafter KSS) have provided us with a well-conceived and well-executed study of the effects of various annuity arrangements on individual and aggregate saving in the presence of lifetime uncertainty. Each of these authors has had a long-standing interest in this area, and their current paper reflects their accumulated expertise. Their results indicate that a potentially sizable fraction of U.S. household wealth represents precautionary saving resulting from the absence of perfect annuity market.

Except in special cases, market work and household membership are jointly chosen. A Nash bargaining model of family behavior is used to specify stochastic structural relationships (two indirect utility functions and a market and a reservation wage function) that jointly determine work, consumption, and household membership. The maximum likelihood estimates of the implied trinomial probit model differ sharply from those obtained when either market work or household membership is taken as exogenous. This application to white male youths from the National Longitudinal Surveys shows the insurance function of families: parents insure their sons against poor market opportunities.

Projects with negative expected value cannot obtain financing in competitive capital markets if all potential investors are risk neutral and have identical beliefs about the distribution of the project′s net revenue. We present a series of examples with heterogeneous beliefs in which it is possible for a project to obtain financing even though all investors in the project believe, conditional on the project being undertaken, that the project has negative expected value. An important feature of the examples is that the differences in beliefs are due only to differences in information, and are not simply arbitrary unexplained differences in opinions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:D8, G1.