Although it is well known that appearance-based impressions affect labor market and election outcomes, little is known about the role appearance plays in financial transactions. We address this question using photographs of potential borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending site. Consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending, we find that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have higher probabilities of having their loans funded. Moreover, borrowers who appear more trustworthy indeed have better credit scores and default less often. Overall, our findings suggest that impressions of trustworthiness matter in financial transactions as they predict investor, as well as borrower, behavior. A man I do not trust could not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom. –John Pierpont Morgan, 1913

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital.

Numerous trading strategies examined in options research exhibit remarkably high mean returns and Sharpe ratios. We show some of these seemingly “good deals” are due to look-ahead biases. These biases stem from using information unavailable at the portfolio formation time to filter out observations suspected of being noisy or erroneous. Our results suggest that elevated Sharpe ratios may serve as potential indicators of such look-ahead biases. Furthermore, deviating from previous literature findings, we show that illiquidity is not strongly priced in stock options and that only a small set of stock characteristics are in fact associated with option expected returns.

The stylized fact that volatility is not priced in individual equity options does not withstand scrutiny. First, we show that the average return of heavily traded deep out‐of‐the‐money call options on stocks is −116 basis points per day. Second, Fama‐MacBeth estimates of the volatility risk premium in stock options are similar to those in S&P 500 Index call options. Third, the mean return of heavily traded delta‐hedged at‐the‐money calls (puts) is −23 (−30) basis points. Fourth, the variance risk premium in stock options is negative. Our analysis highlights the importance of microstructure biases and robustness in empirical work with options.